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SOFTRIGHT: A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION TO THE
PROBLEM OF USERS' AND PRODUCERS' RIGHTS
IN COMPUTER SOFTWARE*
I. INTRODUCTION
If any issue from any of the top microcomputer magazines for the
last two years were selected at random and read carefully, the reader would
probably find at least one reference to the problem of software piracy
or the problems created by the industry's efforts to curb piracy through
copy protection schemes. At least one of these magazines has devoted
an entire issue to the subject,' and many have included major articles
on the subject. The flurry of literature and the complaints from all sides
indicate that there is a serious problem and that there is widespread
dissatisfaction with the current state of the law and industry practice con-
cerning intellectual property protection of software in the United States.
The problems have increased as changes in technology have caused
the microcomputer marketplace to become part of the mass market. When
a similar problem developed in the recording industry as advances in
technology spurred its expansion into a booming mass market over a
decade ago, the copyright law was revised to provide intellectual property
protection schemes that met the needs created by advances in technology. 2
Despite recent minor changes in the copyright law concerning computer
programs,3 major revisions of the intellectual property protection schemes
for computer software are still needed.' As the complaints of program-
mers, developers, and users demonstrate, the minor revisions made in 1980
have done little or nothing to solve the problems.
This comment will examine the intellectual property protection cur-
rently available for computer software under copyright, trade secret and
patent law. It will then examine the complaints of the software program-
mers, developers, and distributors to discover what they are dissatisfied
with in the current law and how they view their needs for increased or
better intellectual property protection. It will also examine the reasons
offered by those who copy software and whether the needs these reasons
reflect can or should be addressed in possible revisions of the law. The
Copyright 1984, by LOuiSIANA LAW REVIEW.
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1. Special Section: Software Piracy, INFOWORLD, Mar. 22, 1982, at 31-47.
2. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 106, 112, 114, 202, 402, 403, 405, 407, 408, 503, 506,
602 (1982).
3. See id. § 117.
4. Anderson, Software Law: He's Forging a New Specialty Where Law, Technology
Meet, USA Today, Dec. 6, 1983, at 3B, col. 3.
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final section of this comment will consist of suggested legislation which
attempts to tailor the law to the needs of programmers and. developers
as well as users, to discourage unwarranted copying of software, and to
make the enforcement of intellectual property rights in software a prac-
tical reality.'
II. THE CURRENT LAW OF SOFTWARE PROTECTION
A. Copyright Protection for Software
1. Historical Overview
Computer programs are currently copyrightable,6 but this has not
always been the case. Before the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976,
there was considerable doubt about whether computer programs comprised
copyrightable subject matter. The Copyright Office refused to accept
copyright applications for computer programs until 1964, and from 1964
until 1978, registrations were granted only under the "rule of doubt." 7
In the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress expressed an intention to grant
some form of copyright protection to computer programs.' The extent
of the protection granted, however, was unclear. Even the Computer Soft-
ware Copyright Act of 1980 does not clearly define the extent of protec-
tion. Furthermore, the number of cases actually decided is small, and only
a few issues have been addressed by more than one circuit of the courts
of appeals. Often an issue has been addressed only by a single district
court, and, therefore, the issues are far from settled.
2. Elements Necessary for Copyrightability
Copyright protection attaches to works of authorship which: (1) com-
prise copyrightable subject matter; (2) are originally created by the author;
5. This Comment assumes that the reader has a basic knowledge of computers and
computer terminology. For a brief introduction to computers, see Note, Copyright Protec-
tion for Computer Programs in Read Only Memory Chips, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 329, 333-44
(1982).
6. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1982).
7. OFFICE OF REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, ANNOUNCEMENT SML-47 (May 1964); COPYRIGHT
OFFICE CicULAR R 310 (Jan. 1965). The "rule of doubt" is a rule under which the Copyright
Office will register the work even if there is some doubt about whether the work is
copyrightable subject matter. When the Office doubts the copyrightability of a work, its
policy is to give the registrant the benefit of the doubt and to register the work. Until
1978, the Copyright Office had doubts about whether computer programs constituted "works
of authorship"; therefore, it had doubts about whether computer programs constituted
copyrightable works. Because human readable source code is necessary for an examiner
to determine whether a program embodied in object code is an original work of authorship,
the Office currently registers object code programs under the "rule of doubt" unless the
application is accompanied by the equivalent source code. See also "Rule of Doubt" Pro-
cedure Itself Put in Doubt in Correspondence with the Copyright Office, SOFTWARE PRO-
TECTION, May 1983, at 2-7.
8. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982); H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976).
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and (3) are fixed in a tangible medium of expression. 9
a. Copyrightable Subject Matter
In order to be copyrightable subject matter, a work must be. a work
of authorship. During the 1960's and early 1970's, the Copyright Office
expressed doubt as to whether computer programs were works of
authorship.' 0 However, Congress clearly expressed its intent that computer
programs be considered works of authorship in the Copyright Act of
1976," and recent cases confirm the copyrightability of computer
programs.' 2 A computer program is considered a literary work of
authorship 3 to which copyright protection attaches." Only the expres-
sion of ideas in a work constitutes copyrightable subject matter. Copyright
does not protect actual ideas, procedures, processes, systems, methods of
operation, concepts, principles, discoveries, or utilitarian aspects of a
work;" it only protects the specific manner in which they are expressed.
For this reason copyright does not protect the algorithms or logic in a
computer program.' 6 The utilitarian aspect of object code was at one time
suggested as a reason for not extending copyright protection to object
code, but this reasoning was ultimately rejected."
b. Originality
Although copyright protection attaches to works originally created by
the author, originality does not require a work to be different from
9. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
10. See supra note 7.
11. See authotities cited supra note 8.
12. Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982); Tandy Corp.
v. Personal Micro Computers, 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
13. H.R. REp. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976); see Apple Computer, Inc.
v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro
Computers, 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
14. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
15. Id. § 102(b); see Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); Midway Mfg. Co. V.
Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466, 480 (D. Neb. 1981).
16. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 56-57 (1976); Keplinger, Computer
Software-Its Nature and Its Protection, 30 EMORY L.J. 483, 506 (1981).
17. Hubco Data Prods. v. Management Assistance, Inc., No. 81-1295, 1983 COPYRIGHT
L. DEC. 25,529 (D. Idaho 1983); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,
545 F. Sumt,. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd & remanded, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984) (appellate decision impliedly rejects lower court holding);
Data Cash Sys. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1979), aff'd on other
grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980).
A work has utilitarian aspects when it serves some function other than communication
of expressions of ideas to human beings. A computer program can have both a utilitarian
function and a communication function. The source code can cause a computer to perform
a particular task, and it can also communicate ideas to humans about how to make a com-
puter perform a task. The object code can only perform the utilitarian function; it cannot
communicate to human beings without the aid of some device which converts magnetic
or electrical impulses into symbols. Thus, it was argued that copyright protection should
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previously existing works. Originality only requires the author to create
the work independently, without copying from another work. If the in-
dependently created work expresses an idea which can be expressed in
several ways, the originality requirement for copyright protection is satisfied
even though another previous work used the exact same words or sym-
bols to express the exact same idea.18
c. Fixation
To be eligible for copyright protection, a work must be "fixed in
any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from
which [it] can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device."' 9 A work is "fixed"
"when its embodiment in a copy . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable
to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for
a period of more than transitory duration."2 There has been much dispute
over whether computer programs stored in ROMS, RAMs, PROMs and
EPROMs2" are sufficiently fixed to be protected by copyright. The
legislative history indicates that the form, manner and medium of fixa-
tion should make no difference to the sufficiency of fixation.22 This view
has been accepted by the courts in granting protection to programs stored
in silicon chips.23
not extend to object code. Despite the rejection of this argument and the extension of copyright
protection to object code, however, programmers often register their object code for copyright
protection while keeping their source code secret; they are still afraid that full copyright
protecion will not be extended to object code and that trade secret protection for the source
code will be needed as a backup for insufficient copyright protection. See infra text accom-
panying notes 200-08.
18. Hubco Data Prods. v. Management Assistance, Inc.; No. 81-1295, 1983 COPYRIGHT
L. DEC. 25,529 (D. Idaho 1983); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,
545 F. Supp. 812, 820 (E.D. Pa. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984); Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Com-
puting Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
19. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
20. Id. § 101.
21. ROMs (Read Only Memory) are silicon chips on which information is microscopically
encoded by means of burned and unburned spots on the silicon wafer. The information
does not disappear when the power is turned off as it does in RAMs (Random Access
Memory) and cannot be written over as occurs in EPROMs (Erasable Programmable Read
Only Memory). The information on these chips can be read only with the aid of a com-
puter, however.
22. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1976).
23. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983),
cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d
870 (3d Cir. 1982); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D.
Cal. 1983); Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981);
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981); Stern Elecs., Inc.
v. Kaufman, 523 F. Supp. 635 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
Similarly, the sufficiency of fixation of video game images in printed circuit boards which
may never display the same sequence or combination of images twice has also been resolved
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3. Scope and Extent of Copyright Protection
a. Exclusive Rights Granted; Scope of Same
Subject to the limitations discussed in the following subsection of this
paper, the owner of a copyright enjoys the exclusive right:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies . . .;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies . . of the copyrighted work to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending;
(4) in the case of literary .. . and . . . audiovisual works, to
perform the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary . . . and . . . audiovisual works, to
display the copyrighted work publicly.2"
i. Copies
The Copyright Act of 1976 defines copies as "material objects ...
in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed,
and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise com-
municated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 2' Cases
decided under the 1907 Act had held that a copy must be readable by
human beings.26 More recent decisions from this period and later deci-
sions based on the Copyright Act of 1976, however, have correctly held
that a reproduction of a computer program need not be human eye
readable to meet the definition of a copy.27 While a reproduction of a
in favor of granting protection. Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870
(3d Cir. 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Il1. 1982),
aff'd, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 90 (1983); Midway Mfg. Co. v.
Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981). The courts reason that a definite number
of images are fixed in the memory of the printed circuit boards and only the specific com-
binations of these images change. Since the images are always the same and only the com-
binations change, the images are sufficiently fixed to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.
24. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
25. Id. § 101.
26. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
27. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983),
cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d
870 (3d Cir. 1982); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D.
Cal. 1983); Hubco Data Prods. v. Management Assistance, Inc., No. 81-1295, 1983 COPYRIGHT
L. DEC. 25,529 (D. Idaho 1983); GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. 718 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 31, 1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Attic Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Il1. 1982),
aff'd, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 90 (1983); Tandy Corp. v. Personal
Micro Computers, 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981); see also Boorstyn, Copyright, Com-
puters, and Confusion, 63 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 276, 277 (1981).
One of the first cases which dealt with the definition of a copy of a computer program,
141719841
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computer program does not have to be human eye readable in order to
constitute a copy, it does have to be sufficiently fixed in a tangible medium
to permit it to be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device. ROMs, PROMs, EPROMs,
diskettes, and printed circuit boards containing object code would be copies
of computer programs under this criterion.28
ii. Derivative works
A derivative work is defined as "a work based upon one or more
preexisting works, such as a translation . . . or any other form in which
a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. ' ' 29 The mere taking of
ideas from a program, however, does not constitute the preparation of
a derivative work because copyright protects only expressions and not
ideas.3" But when a programmer incorporates the expression of ideas, as
opposed to the ideas themselves, from another program into his program,
he has created a derivative work.' Thus, courts have held that the transla-
tion of a program from one computer language to another (i.e., FOR-
TRAN to BASIC)3 2 and the use of a printed circuit board designed to
Data Cash Sys. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Il1. 1979), aff'd on other
grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980), followed the human eye readability test of White-
Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908), and the 1907 Act. The court
felt that the original section 117 of the 1976 Act required it to apply the copyright law
as it existed prior to the 1976 Act to all aspects of a case involving the copyright of a
computer program. The court, however, was incorrect in its assumption that section 117
required it to apply pre-1978 law to determine whether or not a copy had to be human
readable. As section 117 itself and its legislative history made clear, section 117 did not
apply to section 101 which defines a copy. Section 117 only limited sections 106 through
116 and 118 which cover the scope of copyright protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 117. (1982);
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 116 (1976). Therefore, the court should have
applied section 101 to determine whether the ROM was a copy of the program and then
applied pre-1978 law to determine the extent of copyright protection for the copyrighted
program.
28. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983),
cert. dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d
1009 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 90 (1983); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l,
Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982); Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp.,
672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Apple Computer, Inc. v. For-
mula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983); GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q.
718 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 1982).
29. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
30. Id. § 102(b). This principle was explicitly stated by the court in Atari, Inc. v. Amuse-
ment World, Inc., 547 F.. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981). "It seems clear that defendants based
their game on plaintiff's copyrighted game; to put it bluntly, defendants took plaintiff's
idea. However, the copyright laws do not prohibit this." Id. at 230. See also Atari, Inc.
v. Williams, 217 U.S.P.Q. 746, 747 (E.D. Cal. 1981); In re Coin-Operated Audio-Visual
Games & Components Thereof, Investigation No. 337-TA-87 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n
Publication No. 1160 June 25, 1981).
31. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
32. Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1013
n.5 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (dictum).
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speed up a particular video game33 infringe the copyright owner's exclusive
right to prepare derivative works. It is probable that the incorporation
of whole subroutines from one program into a new program would also
be found to infringe this right.34 It has also been suggested that the com-
pilation of a program from source code into object code might constitute
the preparation of a derivative work,3" but this suggestion is probably
incorrect since the compilation into object code is done by a computer
and requires none of the creativity or originality necessary for a derivative
work.3" On the other hand, it could be argued that the creativity required
to write the compiler program is sufficient to make the object code pro-
duced by the compiler a derivative work. Courts, however, apparently
intend to treat object code as a copy and not as a derivative work.37 This
issue is probably moot since the conversion of source code to object code
is a noninfringing use under the Computer Software Copyright Act of
1980 which allows the making of an adaptation provided the "adaptation
is created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program
in conjunction with a machine." 38 However, section 117 may not authorize
every conversion of source code to object code; section 117 only authorizes
conversion for personal use. 9
iii. Performance or Display
Most software packages produce some sort of visual display on a CRT
screen. Anytime the display or a copy of the display is shown publicly,
the copyright owner's exclusive right to display his work is potentially
applicable."' A display is shown publicly when it is shown to a substan-
tial number of persons outside of a normal circle of the family and its
social acquaintances. 41
Many software packages produce a combination of text, graphics, and
sound which meets the definition of an audiovisual work.'" Anytime the
33. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009, 1013 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 90 (1983). The design and distribution of such a board is contributory infringement.
34. Freedman v. Select Information Sys., No. C82-6448-WAI, 1983 COPYRIGHT L. DEC.
25,520 (N.D. Cal. 1983). A subroutine is a part of a program analogous to a chapter
of a book. It can be written once and used several times by the master program.
35. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812, 822 (E.D.
Pa. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 104 S.
Ct. 690 (1984).
36. See Stern, Another Look at Copyright Protection of Software: Did the 1980 Act
Do Anything for Object Code?, 3 COMPUTER L.J. 1, 14 (1981).
37. GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. 718 (N.D. Cal. 1982).
38. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982).
39. For further discussion of what constitutes personal use, see infra text accompany-
ing note 57.
40. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106 (1982).
41. Id. § 101.
42. Audiovisual works are defined as
works that consist of a series of related images which are intrinsically intended
1984] 1419
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visual display or sound generated by the software is shown or played to
the public, either the copyright owner's exclusive right to display his work
or his exclusive right to perform his work is potentially applicable.4 3 These
situations usually arise in classroom or user group settings where people
gather to exchange information about software.
b. Statutory Limitations upon Exclusive Rights
The Copyright Act places limitations on the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner in sections 107 through 118. Not all of these limitations
are applicable to computer programs. Sections 107 (on fair use), 108 (on
reproductions by libraries and archives), 109 (on the transfer of a par-
ticular copy), 110 (on performances and displays), and 117 (on computer
programs) have the potential to limit the exclusive rights of an owner
of copyright in a computer program.
The doctrine of fair use is judicially well established, but it is so flex-
ible that it virtually defies definition.44 Section 107 of the 1976 Act gave
the doctrine express statutory recognition for the first time:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of
a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies
or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section,
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair
use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educa-
tional purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in rela-
tion to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.
The factors listed in this section are illustrative, and no single factor
to be shown by the use of machines, or devices such as projectors, viewers, or
electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of
the nature of the material objects, such as films or tapes, in which the works
are embodied.
Id.
43. Id. §§ 101, 106.
44. H.R. REp. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 (1976).
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is controlling."' The doctrine of fair use is probably the most comprehen-
sive limitation on the exclusive rights of a copyright owner; it applies
to all types of copyrighted works and all rights encompassed in copyright,
including copying and distribution."' Although no cases have as yet ap-
plied the doctrine to computer programs, it is potentially applicable to
such works. The doctrine of fair use might permit such actions as the
making of additional copies of a program used in a classroom setting
after the company which owns the copyright has gone out of business,
if the current copyright owner is unknown and unreachable and the pro-
gram is no longer commercially available. As long as the copyright owner
can be reached through reasonable efforts, however, it is unlikely that
fair use would sanction the copying of an entire program without obtain-
ing prior consent. The situations in which fair use would permit the copy-
ing of programs seem to be determined primarily by reference to the needs
of the user and the goal of securing enough compensation to the author
to encourage him to continue to produce programs, the basis of all
copyright."'
Sections 108 through 118 of the Copyright Act give examples of uses
which have been legislatively declared to be fair and legal uses of
copyrighted works. Section 108 describes several situtations in which a
library or archives which is open to the public or to researchers in its
specialized field may reproduce part or all of a copyrighted work. Several
categories of works are excluded from the coverage of section 108, but
neither computer programs nor literary works are included in this list.
Therefore, the section is potentially applicable to the reproduction of com-
puter programs by libraries. Under section 108, a library would not be
entitled to reproduce extra copies of a program for use by multiple
machines in the library in order to avoid purchasing multiple copies; such
copying would not be "without any purpose of direct or indirect com-
mercial advantage."" What a library can copy depends upon (1) whether
the program is published or unpublished, (2) the availability of an unused
copy at a fair price, (3) whether or not the copy was requested by a user
or another library, and (4) how much of the program is to be copied.
Under subsection 108(b), a library may make a copy of an entire un-
published work in facsimile form solely for purposes of preservation,
security, or deposit for research in another research library. Although the
House of Representatives Report No. 1476 suggests that machine readable
45. N. BOORSTYN, COPYRIGHT LAW § 5:2 (1981).
46. Id.
47. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973).
48. 17 U.S.C. § 108(a)(1) (1982); H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 75 (1976).
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copies do not meet the requirement of facsimile form, 9 this is probably
not true in the case of works which a library owns only in machine
readable form. A facsimile means an exact copy. If the original copy is
in machine readable form, a copy made in machine readable form is an
exact copy and a facsimile. Furthermore, the statement in House Report
No. 1476 only says that machine readable form is not a facsimile when
the original is a manuscript. The context in which "manuscript" is used
in House Report No. 1476 indicates that the term was used to refer to
a handwritten, typewritten, or printed copy which could be perceived by
a human being without the aid of a machine. Therefore, the statement
in House Report No. 1476 should be inapplicable to machine readable
computer programs,"0 and a qualified library should be able to make a
copy of an unpublished computer program solely for archival purposes.
The same result could be achieved under the archival provisions of subsec-
tion 117(1), except that subsection 108(b) would permit the library mak-
ing the copy to give it to another research library, while section 117 would
not permit this. Section 117 probably does not limit section 108 because
the purposes behind the sections are different and neither purpose hinders
the other. The archival provisions of section 117 are intended to mitigate
the problems caused by the fragility of the medium in which computer
programs are stored. The archival provisions of section 108 are intended
to ensure that copies of works remain in collections accessible to the public
even when copies are not commercially available. Because the fragility
of the medium affects libraries as well as other owners, the provisions
of section 117 are needed to ensure that reproducible copies remain in
a library's collections when the circumstances covered by section 108 occur.
Under subsection 108(c), a library could copy a published computer
program to replace a damaged, lost or stolen computer program if the
library or archives cannot obtain an unused copy at a fair price. This
subsection is probably of little use to libraries because it does not allow
the reproduction of the published program before it is lost or destroyed
and does not allow reproducton of the program after the library's copy
is lost or destroyed if an unused copy is available at a reasonable price.
In contrast, section 117 allows any owner of a computer program, in-
cluding a library, to make a backup copy before the damage or loss oc-
curs and regardless of the availability of unused copies at a fair price.
The one situation where subsection 108(c) would probably be used is where
a library makes a copy for another library whose copy is lost or damaged.
49. Id. at 75.
50. This logic would not apply to an eye readable form of the source code for the
program; a machine readable version of such an eye readable copy would not be an exact
copy or a facsimile. Any copy of the eye readable copy which was itself eye readable (which
probably would not also be machine readable), however, would be a facsimile, and therefore
permissible if the other requirements of the section are met.
1422 [Vol. 44
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The library whose copy is lost, damaged or stolen is protected by section
117 because section 117 entitles an owner to a backup copy to prevent
total loss of the program if the original copy is lost or destroyed. The
library which makes the copy needs the protection of subsection 108(c)
because section 117 only protects owners copying for their own archival
purpose; it does not permit the copier to give the copy to another person
even if the other person is a library. Subsection 108(c) is also limited to
facsimile copies, but as explained above, a machine readable copy of a
machine readable original should meet the requirement of facsimile form.
If a user or another library through interlibrary loan requests a copy
of a computer program, a library could copy a small portion of the
program" or an entire program if it is out of print and unavailable at
a fair price.52 The copy must become the property of the user who re-
quested it.
The express authorizations of section 108 do not prohibit a library
from making any other copies of a computer program which would be
a fair use of it." Nevertheless, if the contract under which the library
acquired a copy prohibits all copying, section 108 does not justify the
violation of such a contract.5 '
Section 109 is a limitation upon the copyright owner's exclusive right
to distribute. It allows anyone who owns a copy of a program which
was lawfully made under the copyright laws to transfer ownership of the
copy without permission from the copyright owner. Section 109 applies
only to an owner-it does not apply to the possessor of a leased pro-
gram. The right to transfer is further limited by section 117, which declares
that copies made under that section can only be transferred with the
original from which the copies were made. Adaptations made under sec-
tion 117 can only be transferred with the approval of the copyright owner.
Section 110 contains a number of limitations upon the copyright
owner's exclusive right to display or perform the copyrighted work. The
first four subsections of section 110 permit certain educational, religious,
or nonprofit displays and performances. These subsections probably pro-
tect most schools and user groups which display or perform software while
attempting to share information about the software. These subsections,
however, apply only to nonprofit groups and would not protect commer-
cial computer schools."' Subsection 110(7) protects commercial
establishments which display or perform copyrighted works in a store open
to the public for the sole purpose of promoting retail sales. The perfor-
51. 17 U.S.C. § 108(d) (1982).
52. Id. § 108(e).
53. Id. § 108(0(4).
54. Id.
55. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1976).
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mance must be within the immediate area where the sale is occurring,
and no direct or indirect admission charges are permitted. While this
subsection would protect vendors from liability for free demonstrations
in the store, it would not protect them from liability for displays and
performances which occur in store sponsored classes where admission is
charged. As a practical matter, however, the exposure to liability is very
small since such classes usually increase sales and are readily agreed to
by the copyright owner.
Section 117 is the only section of the Copyright Act which deals
specifically with computer programs. It gives an owner (not a mere
possessor) of a copy of a computer program the right to make copies
for archival or adaptation purposes. House of Representatives Report No.
1307 which covers the Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980 says
that the new section 117 embodies the recommendations of the National
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU)
with respect to computer software. 6 The CONTU report recommends that
allowable adaptations should include the right to translate a program from
one language to another and the right to add features to programs that
were not present at the time of rightful acquisition." Thus, section 117
directly restricts the copyright owner's exclusive right to make derivative
works when the copyrighted work is a computer program.
While a rightful owner of a copy of a computer program has the
right to make such copies and adaptations, he has little or no right to
distribute the copies or adaptations. Normally, the copies or adaptations
may be made only for personal use. Exact copies, however, may be
transferred with the original copy when it is sold, leased or otherwise
transferred, but adaptations can be transferred only when the copyright
owner gives his authorization.
4. Enforcement of Rights
The burden of proving an infringement case is often difficult and
expensive; in fact, the problems and costs associated with a suit to en-
force the rights granted by the Copyright Act with respect to computer
programs raise serious questions as to the value and adequacy of copyright
protection. The difficulty and expense of proving infringement suits restrict
their availability to a small minority of plaintiffs in a very small percen-
tage of the cases of pirating which occur. To make out an infringement
case, the plaintiff must prove (1) that he has a valid copyright and (2)
that the defendant has violated one of his exclusive rights. 8
56. H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-24 (1980).
57. NAT'L COMM'N ON NEW TECHNoLoGIcAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WoRKs, FIAL REPORT
(1978) [hereinafter cited as CONTU REPORT].
58. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 138 (D.N.J. 1982);
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While the plaintiff must establish that he owns a valid copyright for
his program, the certificate of registration gives rise to a presumption both
as to the validity and the ownership of the copyright,"' but, this presump-
tion is rebuttable. Upon the production of evidence by the defendant that
the plaintiff's work was itself copied from a preexisting work, the burden
of going forward has been met and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff
to prove the validity of his copyright."0 The judge may find that the
presumption created by the certificate of registration has been conclusively
rebutted only if the defendant's evidence is sufficient to find as a matter
of law that the plaintiff's program was copied from a preexisting work.6 1
Even if the plaintiff in an infringement suit proves that he owns a
valid copyright, however, he must still prove that the defendant has
violated one of the plaintiff's exclusive rights under the copyright laws.
Plaintiffs usually try to establish this by attempting to prove copying by
the defendant, but copying can be very difficult to prove.
Copying by either the defendant or the plaintiff can rarely be proved
by direct evidence. 2 Copying is usually inferred from a showing that the
alleged copier had access to the plaintiff's (or some other preexisting) work
and that the works are substantially similar.63 Access may be proved either
by the technical similarity between the two programs," or by a showing
of wide dissemination and availability of the plaintiff's (or other preex-
isting) program.65 Substantial similarity is determined from the layman's
point of view and exists if an "ordinary observer, unless he set out to
detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and regard
their asthetic appeal as the same." 6 6 Although exact copying is not re-
quired to establish substantial similarity, something more than the mere
In re Coin-Operated Audio-Visual Games & Components Thereof, Investigation No.
337-TA-87 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Publication No. 1160 June 25, 1981).
59. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 139 (D.N.J. 1982);
In re Coin-Operated Audio-Visual Games & Components Thereof, Investigation No.
337-TA-87 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Publication No. 1160 June 25, 1981).
60. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 139-40 (D.N.J. 1982).
61. Id. at 140.
62. Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222, 227 (D. Md. 1981); Mid-
way Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466, 482 (D. Neb. 1981).
63. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 138 (D.N.J. 1982);
Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222, 227 (D. Md. 1981); Midway
Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466, 482 (D. Neb. 1981).
64. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 138 (D.N.J. 1982);
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466, 482 (D. Neb. 1981).
65. Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222, 227 (D. Md. 1981).
66. Id. (quoting Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1167 (9th Cir. 1977) (quoting Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d
487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960))).
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taking of the idea from another program is required. 7 Substantial similarity
is not destroyed merely by changing the medium.
68
Most of the cases dealing with substantial similarity and computers
are video game cases which focus on the size, shape, color, and move-
ment of the figures on the screen and the "feel" of the game play.
69
Cases dealing with other types of computer programs tend to depend upon
admissions of copying by the defendant,"0 inadept copying which left
telltale identifying marks (such as the plaintiff's name embedded in the
code),7 ' or line for line identical code in the two works."
B. Trade Secret Protection for Software
1. Introduction
Trade secret law, unlike copyright and patent law, is governed ex-
clusively by state law. The large number of different jurisdictions and
the struggles of each to expand its law to meet the needs created by new
technology have resulted in the common law of trade secrets which is
based on the combined theories of unfair competition, property, contract,
quasi-contract, and breach of confidence.3 A number of states have
codified at least the criminal aspects of trade secret law.7" Since the com-
67. Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 222, 228 (D. Md. 1981); 3
M. NIMMER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LITERARY, MUSICAL AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY, AND
THE PROTECTION OF IDEAS § 13.01(B) (1983).
68. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d. 607, 618 n.12
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc.,
546 F. Supp. 125, 139 (D.N.J. 1982).
69. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1982); Mid-
way Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. I11. 1982), aff'd, 704 F.2d 1009
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 90 (1983); Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 547
F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (D.
Neb. 1981); Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 217 U.S.P.Q. 1265
(N.D. 111. 1981), rev'd, 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Atari,
Inc. v. Williams, 217 U.S.P.Q. 746 (E.D. Cal. 1981); Atari, Inc. v. Armenia Ltd., 1981
COPYRIGHT L. DEC. 25,328 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
70. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
71. BPI Sys., v. Leith, 532 F. Supp. 208 (W.D. Tex. 1981).
72. J & K Computer Sys. v. Parrish, 642 P.2d 732 (Utah 1982).
73. Bender, Trade Secret Software Protection, 5 APLA Q.J. 49, 52 (1977).
74. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-2207 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 499c (West Supp. 1984);
COLo. REV. STAT. § 18-4-408 (1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 15-1 to 15-9, 16-1 (Smith-
Hurd 1977 & Supp. 1983-1984); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-43-4-1, 35-43-4-2 (Burns Supp. 1983);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 352-353, 362 (1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 266, § 30(4)
(Michiel Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984); MICH. Comn. LAWS ANN. §§ 752.771-773 (West Supp.
1983-1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.52 (West Supp. 1984); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
637.2-.3 (1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:20-1-:20-3 (West Supp. 1982); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 155.00, .30, 165.07 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1983-1984); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
1333.51 (Page 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1732 (West 1983); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
943.205 (West 1982).
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mon law and the state statutes are usually in agreement upon the basics
of trade secret law, the discussion in this comment will be confined to
the general common law of trade secrets. However, the reader should be
aware that portions of the following discussion may not apply in some
jurisdictions.
2. Definition and Elements of a Trade Secret
Trade secret law clearly protects computer programs." This protec-
tion extends to the computer program itself, to any documentation con-
cerning the program, and to formulas and algorithms incorportated into
the program, if they fit within the definition of a trade secret." The first
Restatement of Torts defined a trade secret as
any formula, pattern, device, or compilation of information which
is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity
to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or
use it. . . It differs from other secret information in a business
• ..in that it is not simply information as to a single or ephemeral
events in the conduct of the business . . . .A trade secret is a
process or device for continuous use in the operation of the
business.77
The cases generally require three elements for the existence of a trade
secret: (1) the information must not be generally known or readily ascer-
tainable; (2) it must be of value to the holder; and (3) the holder must
intend to keep it secret and must have acted in a manner reasonably
calculated to keep it secret.78
75. Unlike copyright protection, trade secret protection has been recognized since the
infancy of the computer programming industry. University Computing Co. v. Lykes-
Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 534-35 (5th Cir. 1974); Hancock v. Decker, 379 F.2d
552 (5th Cir. 1967); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 357-61 (N.D. Okla.
1973), aff'd, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975) (affirming trade
secret aspects); Com-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1229, 1239-40
(E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd, 458 F.2d 1341 (6th Cir. 1972); C6rtek Computer Prods. v. Whit-
field, 203 U.S.P.Q. 1020, 1022 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1977); Ward v. Superior Court, 3 CoM-
PUTER L. SERV. REP. 206 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Lindley, 609 P.2d
733, 743 (Okla. 1980).
76. In re Belth v. Insurance Dep't, 95 Misc. 2d 18, 20, 406 N.Y. S.2d 649, 650 (Sup.
Ct. 1977); see also Smith & Yoches, Legal Protection of Software Via Trade Secrets, 8
APLA Q.J. 240, 240-41 (1980). Note that trade secret law, unlike copyright and patent
law, does not automatically exclude ideas and algorithms from protection.
77. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939). The reporters of the Restatement
Second of Torts omitted the sections on trade secrets because they felt that the subject
fell outside of traditional tort law and had been embraced in the law of unfair competition
and trade regulation.
78. E.g., Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer Sys., 318 N.W.2d 691, 698 (Minn. 1982);
M. Bryce & Assocs. v. Gladstone, 107 Wis. 2d 241, 249-51, 319 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Ct.
App. 1982); see also Gilburne & Johnston, Trade Secret Protection for Software Generally
and in the Mass Market, 3 COMPUTER L.J. 211, 215 (1982).
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a. The "Novelty" Requirement
The requirement that the information not be generally known or
readily ascertainable is often loosely referred to as the novelty require-
ment. The term novelty is a misnomer since the information need not
be new or even a significant advance over prior knowledge in the
industry. 9 "All that is required is that the information or knowledge repre-
sent in some considerable degree the independent efforts of its claimant." 8
Furthermore, the trade secret requirement of novelty should not be con-
fused with the patent requirement of novelty. The patent requirement of
novelty serves a different purpose and is much more difficult to satisfy."S
Trade secret novelty refers to the degree to which the information is known
in the industry in general and is merely intended to insure that the infor-
mation is capable of being kept secret. Although matters of general
knowledge in the industry are not protected by trade secret law,82 par-
ticular combinations of generally known concepts may be protected. 3 Most
computer programs fall under the particular combination theory because
although similiar programs may use the same algorithms and logic, they
combine the algorithms and logic differently to produce programs of dif-
ferent speed, accuracy, cost and commercial feasibility. The combination
which produces the best speed, accuracy or commercial feasibility is suf-
ficiently outside the general knowledge of the industry to be protectable .
When software is protected as a particular combination of generally known
concepts, however, only the combination and not the underlying concepts
are protected.8"
The mere fact that the information sought to be protected is not yet
general knowledge, however, is not quite enough for trade secret status;
the secret also must not be readily ascertainable through proper means.86
79. Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., 378 F. Supp. 806, 812 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
80. Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 373 (7th Cir. 1953).
81. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 899 (Minn. 1983);
Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer Sys., 318 N.W.2d 691, 698 (Minn. 1982) (citing Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974)); see also Milgrim on Trade Secrets,
in 12 BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 2.08 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Milgrim].
82. Automated Sys. v. Service Bureau Corp., 401 F.2d 619, 625 (10th Cir. 1968); Sperry
Rand Corp. v. Pentronics, 311 F. Supp. 910, 913 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Trilog Assocs., Inc.
v. Famularo, 455 Pa. 243, 250, 314 A.2d 287, 292 (1974).
83. Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F.Supp. 258, 320 (N.D. Okla. 1973), aff'd, 510
F.2d 894, 928-30 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975) (affirming trade secret
aspects); Cdrtek Computer Prods. v. Whitfield, 203 U.S.P.Q. 1020, 1024 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1977).
84. Gilburne & Johnston, supra note 78, at 217; see Coin-Share, Inc. v. Computer
Complex, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1229, 1234 (E.D. Mich. 1971), aff'd, 458 F.2d 1341 (6th Cir.
1972); Crtek Computer Prods. v. Whitfield, 203 U.S.P.Q. 1020, 1024 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1977); Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer Sys., 318 N.W.2d 691, 699 (Minn. 1982).
85. Cdrtek Computer Prods. v. Whitfield, 203 U.S.P.Q. 1020, 1024 (Cal. Super. Ct.
1977).
86. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 898 (Minn. 1983);
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Products which can be easily examined and reverse engineered are denied
trade secret protection because of this requirement. The mere fact that
it is possible to reverse engineer a product, however, does not preclude
trade secret protection. The developer of the product is entitled to trade
secret protection for at least the length of time it would take a competitor
to lawfully obtain a copy of the product and reverse engineer, it. 7 For
a long time, it was virtually impossible to reverse engineer a computer
program when only the object code was available; thus, by distributing
only the object code, programmers managed to prevent the contents of
their programs from being easily ascertainable. With the advent and ready
availability of disassemblers and decompilers," however, the contents of
object code programs are becoming more easily ascertainable, and the
trade secret status of widely distributed object code may be seriously
threatened.
b. The Value Requirement
The element of value is usually fairly easy to prove in software cases,9
and it is rarely even questioned. The only mention of value usually ap-
pears in the listing of the elements of a trade secret. In a world where
computer programmers earn an average of fifteen dollars per hour and
are only expected to produce about twenty lines of code per day,9" it is
hard to question the value of even a simple mailing label program which
retails for approximately fifteen dollars. In fact, relatively simple pro-
grams which retail for less than one hundred dollars are the backbone
of the multibillion dollar microcomputer software industry.
c. The Secrecy Requirement
Secrecy is by far the most important element of trade secret status.
The essence of a trade secret is information which gives the possessor
a competitive advantage because his competitors do not have access to
it. If competitors learn the secret, the advantage is gone. The secrecy re-
quired by trade secret law is not absolute secrecy, however; a qualified
or relative secrecy is sufficient.9" The information may be revealed to
employees and customers as necessary in the conduct of business pro-
Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer Sys., 318 N.W.2d 691, 698 (Minn. 1982); Thermotics,
Inc. v. Bat-Jac Tool Co., 541 S.W.2d 255, 260-61 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); see also RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b (1939).
87. Data Gen. Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, 297 A.2d 433, 436 (Del. Ch. 1971),
aff'd, 297 A.2d 437 (Del. 1972).
88. Computer programs which translate object code back to source code.
89. Gilburne & Johnston, supra note 78, at 215.
90. Barden, The Appliance Computer, POPULAR COMPUTING, July 1983, at 58, 59.
91. Data Gen. Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, 297 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1972);
Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer Sys., 318 N.W.2d 691, 700 (Minn. 1982).
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vided reasonable efforts are made to prevent the secret from being revealed
to people outside the privy group.92 Lax procedures both in-house and
in allowing access to information by outsiders can easily cause the loss
of protection through a determination either that the holder never con-
sidered the information to be a secret or that the holder allowed the in-
formation to become non-secret by failing to follow procedures reasonably
designed to ensure secrecy.93 Limited physical access to areas where the
secret information is kept and confidentiality agreements for employees
and customers seem to be required as a minimum effort in maintaining
secrecy.9 '
Even when the holder of a trade secret binds his employees and
customers not to disclose his secrets, a trade secret can still be lost through
disclosure. Trade secrets are not necessarilyprivileged information which
can be withheld during discovery" and trial. Although the damage done
by disclosure in litigation may often be mitigated by protective orders,96
the number of people who know the trade secret and who cannot be
directly monitored for disclosure by the holder has been increased, and
the threat to secrecy has been increased.
Mass marketing of computer software also increases the danger that
the trade secrets in the software will be inadvertantly disclosed to the public.
Although courts have held that the mass distribution of software is not
by itself sufficient disclosure to cause a loss of secrecy, 7 unrestricted
marketing can cause a loss of secrecy if the secret can be discerned by
scrutiny and inspection of the product.9 As disassembler and decompiler
programs become readily available, programs which are mass marketed
in object code only to protect their secrecy will become more vulnerable
to scrutiny and inspection which may reveal their secrets and cause a loss
of protection.
3. Scope of Trade Secret Protection
Once the existence of a trade secret has been established, the owner
is protected against misappropriation of his secret through improper con-
92. Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer Sys., 318 N.W.2d 691, 700 (Minn. 1982).
93. Id.
94. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 901-903 (Minn.
1983); Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer Sys., 318 N.W.2d 691, 700 (Minn. 1982).
95. Centurion Indus. v. Warren Steurer & Assocs., 665 F.2d 323, 325-26 (10th Cir. 1982).
96. Id. at 326; Penn v. Metro Data Co., No. 81 C 3051 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 29, 1981)
(available Sept. 1, 1983, on LEXIS Pat cop Library); In re Belth v. Insurance Dep't, 95
Misc. 2d 18, 406 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
97. Management Science of Am., Inc. v. C6rg Sys., 6 COMPUTER L. SERV. REP. 921,
925 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Data Gen. Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, 357 A.2d 105, 114
(Del. Ch. 1975).
98. Speedry Chem. Prods. v. Carter's Ink Co., 306 F.2d 328, 334 (2d Cir. 1962);
Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Elecs., 564 F. Supp. 1471, 1476 (D. Nev. 1983); National Welding
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duct. He is protected against (1) discovery of the secret by improper means;
(2) disclosure or use of the secret which constitutes a breach of an ex-
press or implied duty of confidence; (3) use of the secret by one who
learned the secret from a third person with notice that it was a secret
and that the third person discovered it by improper means or that the
third person's disclosure of it was a breach of confidence; (4) use of the
secret by one who learned of it with notice that it was a secret and its
disclosure was made to him by mistake; and (5) use of the secret by one
who learned of the secret without notice that it. was a secret and that
disclosure to him was a breach of confidence or who learned of the secret
through a mistake without notice of the secrecy and mistake, after he
receives notice of such facts.99 The owner is not protected against (1) in-
dependent discovery through proper means;' °° (2) disclosure or use of the
secret which does not constitute a breach of confidence;"0 ' and (3) use
of the secret by one who learned of the secret without notice that it was
a secret and that disclosure to him was a breach of confidence, or who
learned of the secret through a mistake without notice of the secrecy and
mistake, before he receives notice of such facts. 0 2
Once protection attaches, it lasts for as long as the secret is not
discovered by legitimate means.' 0 3 Even when the information is discovered
by improper means and is therefore no longer secret from all competitors,
the original holder is entitled to protection from use by the improper
discoverers for at least as long as it would have taken a competitor to
discover the secret through proper means. 104
a. Discovery Through Proper Means
As noted above, the owner of a trade secret receives no protection
against the independent discovery of the secret through proper means.
There are two primary means of independent discovery that are considered
proper. The first is completely independent discovery. Thus, if one com-
puter programmer manages to write a program that is exactly like a preex-
Equip. Co. v. Hammon Precision Equip. Co., 165 F. Supp. 788, 795 (N.D. Cal. 1958);
Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d 279, 289-90, 23 Cal. Rptr. 198, 211-12
(1962).
99. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 757-758 (1939).
100. Milgrim, supra note 81, § 5.04[1].
101. Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401
F. Supp. .1102, 1110-12 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
102. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 758 (1939); see Computer Print Sys. v. Lewis, 281 Pa.
Super. 240, 254, 422 A.2d 148, 155 (1980); Milgrim, supra note 81, § 5.04[2][a].
103. University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 534 (5th
Cir. 1974).
104. Data Gen. Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, 297 A.2d 433, 436 (Del. Ch. 1971),
aff'd, 297 A.2d 437 (Del. 1972); Analogic Corp. v. Data Translations, Inc., 371 Mass. 643,
647-48, 358 N.E.2d 804, 807-08 (1976).
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isting program written by another programmer without ever seeing or hear-
ing of the preexisting program, he could not be held liable for misap-
propriation of a trade secret. The second proper means of discovery is
reverse engineering. Reverse engineering is the process of examining and
analyzing a product to discover the process by which it was created.",5
Under trade secret law, a person is not prohibited from buying a product
on the market and using reverse engineering to discover the secret and
making use of it. ' 6 Reverse engineering would allow a programmer to
buy a copy of the program on the market and examine its documentation
and operation in order to write a program that performs the same tasks
in the same or similar manner. It would also permit a person to buy
a copy of the program and then use a disassembler or decompiler to
translate the object code back to human readable source code. He could
then write a program with the information he gleaned from the decom-
piled code.
b. Duty Not to Disclose Created by Confidential Relationships
Similarly, the owner of a trade secret is not protected against the
disclosure or use of that secret by some party in a contractual relation-
ship with the owner unless the disclosure or use by that party constitutes
a breach of confidence. Thus, the existence of trade secret protection in
these situations depends upon the existence of a duty of confidence owed
by the disclosing party to the owner. The existence of a duty of con-
fidence may arise from an express contract with buyers, users, employees,
or any other party or from an implied contract based upon an employ-
ment relationship. Thus, a confidential relationship based on an express
contract containing a restrictive use clause may subject a buyer to liabil-
ity for disclosure of software secrets. ' Similarly, an express agreement
with a lessee or licensee of software restricting use and disclosure can
provide a basis for breach of confidence.' 8 Even express nondisclosure
agreements signed by prospective customers during demonstrations of soft-
ware have been used as a basis for wrongful breach of confidence.'0 9
Confidential relationships with employees are much more complex than
relationships with customers, lessees, licensees, and prospective customers.
Even when no express agreements have been signed, an employee has an
105. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476. (1974).
106. Analogic Corp. v. Data Translations, Inc., 371 Mass. 643, 647-48, 358 N.E.2d 804,
807 (1976).
107. University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 535 (5th
Cir. 1974).
108. Cf. Management Science of Am. v. C6rg Sys., 6 COMPUTER L. SERV. REP. 921
(N.D. Ill. 1978).




implied duty not to wrongfully use or disclose trade secrets disclosed to
him by his employer." ' However, this implied duty does not prevent an
employee from using and disclosing general knowledge and skill which
he acquired during his employment-i.e., knowledge he would have ac-
quired anyway, irrespective of whom he worked for in the field."' Fur-
thermore, the manner in which the employee gained the knowledge alleged
to be a trade secret may determine whether the knowledge falls within
the ambit of this implied duty. If the subject matter of the trade secret
is in being and an employee learns about it in the course of his employ-
ment in a relationship of confidence, the duty not to use or disclose trade
secret knowledge adversely to his employer arises. On the other hand,
if the subject matter of the trade secret is brought into being because
of the initiative of the employee in its creation, innovation or develop-
ment even though the relationship is one of confidence, no duty arises
since the employee may then have an interest in the subject matter at
least equal to that of his employer or, in any event, such knowledge is
a part of the employee's skill and experience. In such a case, absent an
express contractual obligation by the employee not to use or disclose such
confidential information acquired.during his employment adverse to his
employer's interest, he is free to use or disclose it in subsequent employ-
ment activity." 2
A general nondisclosure agreement is not sufficient to establish an
"express contractual obligation" preventing an employee from later us-
ing information which he developed;" 3 an express agreement covering
secrets developed by the employee is required.
110. Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401
F. Supp. 1102, 1111 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer Sys., 318 N.W.2d
691, 701, 744-45 (Minn. 1982).
111. Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401
F. Supp. 1102, 1110-11 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Dynamics Research Corp. v. Analytic Sciences
Corp., 9 Mass. App. Ct. 254, 400 N.E.2d 1274 (1980); Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer
Sys., 318 N.W.2d 691, 701-02 (Minn. 1982).
112. Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401
F. Supp. 1102, 1111 (E.D. Mich. 1975); see also Amoco Prod. Co. v. Lindley, 609 P.2d
733, 744-45 (Okla. 1980).
113. Amoco Prod. Co. v. Lindley, 609 P.2d 733, 745 (Okla. 1980); see also Structural
Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp, 401 F. Supp. 1102,
1112-13 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (an example of a contract which was sufficient to provide pro-
tection). The problem of an employee disclosing trade secrets through use of his skill and
general knowledge acquired during employment can sometimes be cured by contracts con-
taining covenants not to compete. Electronic Data Sys. Corp. v. Powell, 524 S.W.2d 393,
397-98 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). However, covenants not to compete are void in many jurisdic-
tions. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 1964); LA. R.S. 23:921 (1964); Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 445.761 (West 1967). The prohibition of LA. R.S. 23:921 is subject to the
following proviso:
[P]rovided that in those cases where the employer incurs an expense in the train-
ing of the employee or incurs an expense in the advertisement of the business
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4. Enforcement of Trade Secret Protection
In addition to proving the existence and misappropriation of a trade
secret, a plaintiff in a trade secret action must prove that the defendant
has used or is about to use the plaintiff's trade secret.' 14 Proof of com-
mercial use of software is often similiar to proof of copying for copyright
purposes. Use can be shown by the presence of telltale bugs and spaghetti
code"' in the defendant's software which exactly match those found in
the plaintiff's software."' Telltale bug proof, however, can only be used
in the cases where actual copies of code were improperly obtained and
copied. In cases where the employees take their employer's trade secrets
with them in their memories, other means of proof must be used. The
improbability of the defendant's ability to independently develop the soft-
ware in question in the amount of time available has also been used as
circumstantial evidence of use."' The defendant need not have actually
made a profit from his use of the plaintiff's software. An attempt to
market software which has clearly been misappropriated from the plain-
tiff is sufficient evidence of use or attempt to use." 8
Once the plaintiff has proven the existence, misappropriation, and
use of a trade secret, he is entitled to injunctive relief and damages.'' 9
When the defendant's actual profits can be proved, they are usually used
as a measure of the value of the trade secret to the defendant.'20 But
where the defendant has not yet reaped profits or where they cannot be
that the employer is engaged in, then in that event it shall be permissible for
the employer and employee to enter into a voluntary contract and agreement
whereby the employee is permitted to agree and bind himself that at the termina-
tion of his or her employment that said employee will not enter into the same
business that employer is engaged over the same route or in the same territory
for a period of two years.
114. University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 540 (5th
Cir. 1974).
115. Spaghetti code is a series of excessive branch statements and useless code which
does not affect the functioning of a program but which is deliberately inserted in unusual
and illogical places in the program. Programmers use spaghetti code as a means of placing
distinguishing or identifying marks in their programs; it is highly unlikely that two pro-
grammers who did not see each other's code would produce exactly the same code including
exactly the same dummy spaghetti code.
116. Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401
F. Supp. 1102, 1117 (E.D. Mich. 1975); cf. BPI Sys. v. Leith, 532 F. Supp. 208, 210 (W.D.
Tex. 1981) (other program similarities indicative of copying).
117. Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 319-20 (N.D. Okla. 1973), aff'd,
510 F.2d 894, 928-30 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975) (affirming trade secret
aspects); cf. M. Bryce & Assocs. v. Gladstone, 107 Wis. 2d 241, 250, 319 N.W.2d 907,
912 (Ct. App. 1982).
118. University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 540-41 (5th
Cir. 1974).
119. Milgrim, supra note 81, §§ 7.08[l], [3].
120. University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 536-40 (5th
Cir. 1974).
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proved, a "reasonable royalty" in an amount upon which a person desir-
ing to use the trade secret and a person desiring to license it would agree
is a proper measure of damages. "' In calculating the "reasonable royalty"
fee, the trier of fact should consider such factors as the resulting and
foreseeable changes in the parties' competitive position, the prices past
licensees may have paid, the total value of the secret to the plaintiff (in-
cluding development costs and the importance of the secret to the plain-
tiff's business), the nature and extent of the defendant's intended use,
and any other factors relevant to the particular case.' 22 These principles
usually provide an adequate damage remedy except in the case where the
defendant has in some manner completely destroyed the value of the trade
secret-for instance, by publication. In such a case, the appropriate
measure of damages is the total value of the trade secret to the plaintiff,
including, but not limited to, development costs.' 23
C. Patent Protection for Software
1. Introduction
The patentability of computer software has been the subject of a long
battle between the Patent and Trademark Office and the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals, with the United States Supreme Court acting as a
reluctant mediator. From 1969 to 1981, the Patent Office fought to keep
computer software unpatentable while the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals insisted upon extending protection to at least some software. While
the Patent Office appeared to have won the early rounds,'" the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals appears-to have won the latest rounds
with the Supreme Court decisions in Diamond v. Diehr'25 and Diamond
v. Bradley.'2 6
In Diamond v. Diehr, the Supreme Court held that the mere presence
of a computer program in an otherwise patentable claim will not destroy
patentability.' 7 In Diamond v. Bradley, an equally divided Court affirmed
the decision of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals that held that
at least some computer programs and program related inventions are
patentable. 128 Thus, the Supreme Court has said that computer software




124. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976);
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
125. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
126. 450 U.S. 381 (1981), aff'g In re Bradley, 600 F.2d 807 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (per curiam)
(judgment affirmed by an equally divided court).
127. 450 U.S. at 185.
128. In re Bradley, 600 F.2d 807, 811 (C.C.P.A. 1979), aff'd sub nom. Diamond v.
Bradley, 450 U.S. 381 (1981) (per curium).
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given software any special status in obtaining patentable subject matter
status. Software must meet all of the ordinary requirements of patentability
to qualify for patent protection.12 9 For this reason, it is probable that
inherent characteristics of the majority of computer programs, especially
mass marketed microcomputer software, will continue to make it exceed-
ingly difficult to obtain patent protection for most software.
2. Requirements for Obtaining a Patent
Sections 101 through 103 and 112 of title 35 of the United States
Code define the requirements of patentability. The invention must fit within
one of the categories of statutory subject matter, 3 ' it must be novel,' 3 '
and it must not have been obvious at the time it was invented to a person
having ordinary skill in the subject matter to which the invention is
related. 2 The applicant must also disclose sufficient information about
the invention to enable anyone skilled in the relevant subject matter to
make and use the invention.' 3
a. Patentable Subject Matter
According to section 101, which establishes the categories of statutory
subject matter, patents may be granted for "any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof. ' ' '34 A process is defined as a process, art, or method
or a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture or composition
of matter.' Any software for which patent protection is sought must
be made to fit into one of these categories of statutory subject matter.
Attempts to patent software usually try to characterize it as a process
or as part of a new machine, i.e., a programmed computer.' 36
All of the categories of statutory subject matter have been interpreted
to exclude scientific principles, laws of nature, mathematical formulas,
and methods of calculation.' These exclusions have created a maze of
pitfalls and traps in any attempt to obtain a patent for software.
129. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358, 1366 (D. Del. 1983).
130. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
131. Id. § 102.
132. Id. § 103.
133. Id. § 112.
134. Id. § 101.
135. Id. § 100(b).
136. Davidson, Protecting Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis, 23 JuRxmics
J. 339, 349 (1983); see, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (process claim); In
re Bradley, 600 F.2d 807 (C.C.P.A. 1979), aff'd sub nom. Diamond v. Bradley, 450 U.S.
381 (1981) (per curiam) (operating claim).
137. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185-87 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584,




Most of the attempts to patent computer related inventions have
centered around the presence and effect of a mathematical algorithm im-
plemented by a computer through a computer program. In Gottschalk
v. Benson, the United States Supreme Court defined an algorithm as "[a]
procedure for solving a given type of mathematical problem.""'3 Much
confusion has been caused by the fact that this definition of the term
"algorithm" differs from that used generally in the computer industry.' 9
In the computer industry, the term "algorithm" is generally used to mean
a procedure consisting of a sequence of logical operations which combine
data, mathematical principles and equipment for the purpose of inter-
preting and/or acting upon certain input data.' 0 It must be emphasized
that when the Supreme Court used the term "algorithm" it was referring
to a procedure for solving a mathematical problem and not a procedure
for interpreting or acting on input data. A mathematical algorithm or
formula itself cannot be patented.'"' This does not-mean that any inven-
tion or program which involves a mathematical formula is unpatentable.'l 2
It simply means that a process claim which contains a mathematical for-
mula cannot be drawn so broadly that it covers all uses, known and
unknown, of the formula.' 3 A patent will not be granted on an invention
or program involving a mathematical formula where the practical effect
of granting the patent would be to preempt all use of the formula.
Nevertheless, many patent applications that could otherwise be granted
are defeated because the claims are drafted too broadly. This problem
is exacerbated by the fact that one cannot avoid the trap of overly broad
drafting by the mere addition of conventional post-solution activity to
the program or by the identification of a limited area of intended
application.'
138. 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972).
139. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358, 1366-67 (D. Del. 1983).
140. Id. at 1367.
141. Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 65-67.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 68. In Gottschalk, Benson tried to patent a method of programming a general
purpose digital computer to convert binary coded decimal numbers to pure binary numbers.
The Court found that the claim was so broadly drafted that it covered all known and unknown
uses of the binary coded decimal to pure binary conversion formula. The Court felt that
the practical effect of granting Benson's application would be to patent an abstract idea
and preempt all practical use of it; it therefore denied the application. Id. at 71-72.
144. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). In Parker the invention was a process im-
plemented by a computer program which took four values supplied by the operator and
using a mathematical formula calculated a fifth value. The program itself apparently did
nothing with the calculated number except report it back to the operator. The Court felt
that Flook's program was simply a method of calculating, and therefore, was not patent-
able. Id. at 594-95. The fact that Flook limited his claim to the formula to any use in
the process of catalytic chemical conversion of hydrocarbons did not change the fact that
his claim was essentially a claim to a method of calculation which could not be patented.
Id. at 589-90. This line of reasoning is likely to prevent any general statistical utility soft-
ware from being patented.
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While a formula itself cannot be patented, however, the application
of a newly discovered formula in a particular process may be patented,
if the process as a whole is patentable. 4 When a patent claim recites
a formula, the claim must be examined to see whether it is seeking patent
protection for the formula in the abstract or for a structure or process
which applies the formula but which, considered as a whole, performs
a function which the patent laws are designed to protect.' 46 Such a patent
claim and the inquiry it involves were presented in Diamond v. Diehr.
In Diamond v. Diehr, Diehr applied for a patent on a process for
molding rubber which ensured that the rubber would always be perfectly
cured. A computer operated by a program took constant measurements
of the temperature of the mold and applied a known formula to con-
stantly recalculate the remaining cure time taking into account changes
in temperature during the elapsed cure time. When the computer calculated
that the remaining cure time was exactly zero, it automatically opened
the mold. Diehr did not attempt to claim patent protection for the for-
mula itself;'4 7 he claimed only the improved process for curing rubber.'4
Since Diehr only attempted to patent a total process and not the formula
itself or a method of calculation, the Court held that the presence of
the formula and the computer solution of it did not destroy the statutory
subject matter of the process as a whole."19
Since Diehr, the lower courts have followed a two-step analysis in
deciding whether patent claims for computer related inventions, which are
usually predicated upon an assertion that the application of a formula'
is part of a particular process, involve one of the categories of statutory
subject matter or one of the exclusions to those categories. This analysis
was originally set forth in In re Walter'" and was approved by the
Supreme Court in Diehr.
First, the claim is analyzed to determine whether a mathematical
algorithm is directly or indirectly recited. Next, if a mathematical
algorithm is found, the claim as a whole is further analyzed to
determine whether the algorithm is "applied in any manner to
physical elements or process steps," and, if it is, it "passes muster
under [section] 101.'' '
145. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187-88 (1981); Gottschalk v. Bensen, 409 U.S.
63, 67 (1972).
146. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-92 (1981).
147. Id. at 181.
148. Id. at 191.
149. Id. at 192-93.
150. 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
151. In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 915 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (quoting In re Walter, 618 F.2d




An indication as to what types of computer-related claims will be held
to involve statutory subject matter under this analysis can be obtained
from cases recently decided in the lower courts.
In Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 2 the district court for the district of Delaware
upheld a patent for a data processing system which managed a combined
brokerage margin account, money market account, and charge/checking
account plan because the court could not find any direct or indirect recita-
tion of any procedure for solving a mathematical problem in the claims. 53
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was also unable to find
any mathematical algorithm in In re Pardo,"4 which involved a compiler
program that could accept statements using variables before the statements
which defined the variables to be used. The court stated that "[tihe method
operates on any program and any formula which may be input, regardless
of mathematics content. That a computer controlled according to the in-
vention is capable of handling mathematics formulas is irrelevant to the
question of whether a mathematical algorithm is recited by the claims.""' 5
In In re Meyer & Weisman,3 6 however, the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals found an algorithm recited in the claims and decided that
the claims claimed the algorithm itself without applying it to physical
elements or process steps. The software in Meyer & Weisman stored and
statistically analyzed data collected by a neurologist during a physical ex-
amination and helped him to reach a diagnosis. Both the data collected
and the relationship between each set of data and the diagnosis it sug-
gested were well known and used by all neurolgists. The software simply
used a mathematical algorithm to relieve the physician of the normal
manual process of collecting and analyzing the data."3 7
Both a recited algorithm and a process which operated to transform
physical elements were found by the Court of Customs and Patent Ap-
peals in In re Taner.'" The computerized process involved received raw
sonic, seismic data and transformed it into a pictoral representation of
the earth formations through which the sound waves had passed. The
process claim which used the algorithm as one of its steps was upheld.
In In re Abele'" the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals upheld
one claim, which described a process whereby a computer tomography
152. 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983).
153. Id. at 1368.
154. 684 F.2d 912 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
155. Id. at 916.
156. 215 U.S.P.Q. 193 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
157. Id. at 197-99.
158. 681 F.2d 787, 790 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
159. 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
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scanner produced X-ray data 'which was then manipulated by a computer
using a mathematical algorithm to produce a display which enhanced cer-
tain parts of the picture and blurred other parts, while rejecting another
claim in the same application which merely described the method by which
the computer calculated the new data from the old data. Both claims in
Abele had recited an algorithm, but only one claim had applied it in a
process to transform physical elements. The claim which described the
steps by which the computer calculated the new data was held to be a
claim to the formula itself and was, therefore, disallowed.160
A hypothetical example may help to further explain which types of
computer related claims are statutory subject matter under the current
state of the law. Suppose a biochemist/programmer is involved in the
task of growing regenerative micro-organisms. It is known that the amount
of time it will take a given number of cells to use up a given amount
of nutrient solution depends upon several hundred rapidly changing
variables. However, conditions change so rapidly that current computers
using known methods cannot process the data fast enough to keep the
nutrient solution refreshed at the most efficient rate. The biochemist/pro-
grammer develops a software package that measures the data and pro-
cesses it much more quickly than prior methods. This software uses a
newly discovered algorithm to constantly resolve the many simultaneous
equations necessary to calculate the exact rate at which nutrients must
be added to the constantly changing solution. Since the equations can
now be solved much faster, the computer can now make rapid changes
in the rate at which the nutrient is added to the solution, and the solu-
tion now remains always at the most efficient mix and produces the max-
imum number of new cells per minute. The formula which is used to
solve the simultaneous equations more rapidly is a mathematical algorithm.
Any claim which merely describes the steps used to solve the equations
will be interpreted as a claim to the algorithm itself and will be denied
because to uphold it would preempt all uses of the algorithm.' 1 A newly
discovered method of solving mathematical problems is a law of nature
which belongs to everyone. This patent cannot be allowed to tie up the
simultaneous equation formula so that it could not be used in totally dif-
ferent applications such as maximum profit business models. Similarly,
any claim which recited the formula and claimed to preempt all uses of
it in the microbiology industry would be too broad and would be
stricken.' The biochemist/programmer, for instance, could not prevent
the formula for rapid solution of simultaneous equations from being used
160. Id. at 908.
161. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 908 (C.C.P.A.
1982).
162. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978).
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in software designed to control the proper drying conditions for fish food
made by drying plankton. However, a claim which described the process
for monitoring nutrient solutions for growing regenerative cells and which
described the simultaneous equation solution algorithm as one of its steps
would be upheld.' 63 Such a claim protects a process for making composi-
tions of matter and is the type of process which has always been patent-
able. The fact that this process was not possible until the new algorithm
was discovered and applied does not make it unpatentable. Nor does the
fact that a computer is required to run the process fast enough to make
it useful affect the patentability of the process. The computer is simply
the best means of implementing the process.
b. Novelty
In addition to falling within one of the categories of statutory sub-
ject matter, an invention must also be novel and nonobvious to qualify
for a patent."' 35 U.S.C. § 102 states that an applicant will not be en-
titled to a patent for his invention if- (1) the invention was known or
used by others in this country before the applicant invented it, (2) the
invention was patented in this or a foreign country before the applicant
invented it, (3) the invention was described in a printed publication in
this or a foreign country before the applicant invented it, (4) the inven-
tion was in public use or on sale in this country more than one year
before the applicant filed his application, (5) the invention was patented
in this or a foreign country more than one year before the applicant filed
his application, (6) the invention was described in a printed publication
in this or a foreign country more than one year before the applicant filed
his application, (7) the invention was described in a patent granted or
an application for a patent filed by another person in the United States
before the applicant invented it, or (8) the invention was invented in this
country by someone else before the applicant invented it.' 6'
The requirement that an invention be novel in order to merit patent
protection-one of the concerns addressed in section 102-is generally
known as the novelty requirement. An earlier invention that defeats the
novelty of an applicant's invention is said to anticipate the applicant's
invention. An invention need not be identical to the applicant's invention
to anticipate it. If there is an invention created before the applicant's
invention that would have violated a patent granted on the applicant's
invention if it had been invented later, the earlier invention anticipates
163. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187-88 (1981); In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 908-09
(C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Taner, 681 F.2d 787, 790-91 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
164. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (1982).
165. Id. § 102.
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the applicant's invention.' 6 6 Concepts and points of similarity from several
prior inventions cannot be combined to anticipate the applicant's inven-
tion and destroy the element of novelty.'
6 7
c. Nonobviousness
Although earlier inventions cannot be combined to destroy the novelty
of the applicant's invention, they can, however, be combined to prove
that the applicant's invention does not meet the requirement of nonob-
viousness set out in 35 U.S.C. § 103. 68 According to section 103, an in-
vention may not be patented "if the differences between the subject mat-
ter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject mat-
ter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains."'6 9 The presence or absence of nonobviousness turns upon
three factors: the scope and content of the prior art, the differences be-
tween the prior art and the claims at issue, and the level of ordinary skill
in the pertinent art. 7 '
While the level of skill against which the nonobviousness of the in-
vention is to be tested is not that of a layman, but that of a person
reasonably skilled in the applicable art,' it is difficult to precisely establish
the current state of knowledge in any art. For this reason, the problem
solved by the invention and the efforts of others to solve that problem
in the past are often examined. Substantial efforts by others in the field
which have failed to solve the problem solved by the claimed invention
are persuasive evidence of nonobviousness.7 2
The requirement of nonobviousness will preclude patent protection
for the majority of computer programs since most programs result from
the application of combinations of generally known programming skills
and/or generally known data processing concepts.'73 They are valuable
primarily because of the amount of time and effort it took to compose
and debug them. However, all combinations of such programming skills
and concepts, and therefore all computer programs, are not obvious and
166. Aerotec Indus. v. Pacific Scientific Co., 381 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 1049 (1968); White Consol. Indus. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc., 214 U.S.P.Q.
796, 828 (S.D. Mich. 1982).
167. White Consol. Indus. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc., 214 U.S.P.Q. 796, 828-30 (S.D.
Mich. 1982); see also Tee-Pak, Inc. v. St. Regis Paper Co., 491 F.2d 1193, 1198 (6th Cir.
1974).
168. See Reeves Instrument Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 444 F.2d 263, 270
(9th Cir. 1971).
169. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982).
170. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 225-27 (1976).
171. Id. at 229.
172. Reeves Instrument Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 444 F.2d 263, 271-72 (9th
Cir. 1971).
173. Gilburne & Johnston, supra note 78, at 217; Bender, supra note 73 at 69 & n.97.
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unpatentable.'" Inventions which involve combinations of elements which
are individually known to those skilled in the art must be carefully
scrutinized because the probability of finding obviousness in such inven-
tions is high.' 5 If all the elements were known in the prior art, the com-
bination must produce unusual or surprising consequences to be
nonobvious.'' Thus, while it is not impossible for computer programs
to meet the requirement of nonobviousness,' 7" it is unlikely that many
programs will meet them.
d. Disclosure
Even if an invention is patentable, an application will be denied if
it fails to describe the invention sufficiently. 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires
an applicant to describe the invention "in such full, clear, concise, and
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains,
or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same."' 78
The description is sufficient even though it is incomprehensible to an un-
skilled person, if it is sufficient for a skilled person to make and use
the invention.' 79 Every detail need not be disclosed, but a part essential
to one skilled in the art to make or use the invention cannot be left out
merely because it is a trade secret.' One of the purposes behind disclosure
is to allow others to make and use the invention after the patent has
expired.' 8 ' If information could be left out merely because it was a trade
secret, the applicant could extend his monopoly beyond the patent period
by refusing to license the trade secret. 8 '
This requirement may put some software owners in a Catch-22 situa-
tion. The software may be sufficiently novel'83 to be protectable by trade
secret status but not sufficiently nonobvious to be protectable as a separate
claim in the patent.'' If it is disclosed in the patent application, trade
secret protection may be lost because the software is no longer sufficiently




177. See Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983); In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912 (C.C.P.A. 1982);
In re Taner, 681 F.2d 787 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
178. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982).
179. White Consol. Indus. v. Vega-Servo Control, Inc., 214 U.S.P.Q. 796, 823-24 (S.D.
Mich. 1982).
180. Id. at 823; cf. id. at 825 (retaining a trade secret essential part violates the "best
mode" requirement of 112).
181. Id. at 822.
182. Id. at 823-24.
183. The term "novel" is used here in the sense that it is used in trade secret law,
not in the sense it is used in patent law. See supra text accompanying notes 79-88.
184. Cf. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976) (discussing the standard of nonob-
viousness for patentability).
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secret,"' and the applicant still may not obtain a patent if the software
is too "obvious." If'it is not disclosed, the applicant takes the chance
that his application for the rest of his invention will be invalid because
he did not disclose information essential to a person skilled in the art
to make and use the invention.' 6 If his entire invention is software related
and he is unsure of patentability, the applicant should theoretically be
able to apply for a patent and then fall back on trade secret protection
if the patent is denied, for patent applications are supposed to be
confidential.8 7 In reality, if the applicant chooses to pursue his applica-
tion through an appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, '
the confidentiality may be lost since large excerpts from the claims and
long discussions of the invention frequently appear in the opinions even
when the claim is denied.8 9
3. Scope and Enforcement of Patent Rights
Even when the software developer or programmer has been granted
a patent, his troubles are far from over. Although 35 U.S.C. § 154 gives
him the exclusive right to make, use, or sell his invention for seventeen
years, the problems involved in enforcing this right are serious. The percen-
tage of concluded lawsuits for patent infringement in which the patentee
has emerged the winner has been and continues to decline.' 90 To prove
infringement, the patentee must prove that (1) his invention was made,
used or sold, (2) during the term of the patent (3) by one without authority
to do so.' 9' The plaintiff must show that the defendant's device "does
substantially the same work in substantially the same way to accomplish
substantially the same result" as the invention described in the claims of
the plaintiff's patent.' 9 Under this reasoning, also known as the doctrine
of equivalents, a programmed computer can infringe a patent on a
dedicated machine,'"3 and the reverse is probably also true.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 91-98.
186. See, e.g., White Consol. Indus. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc., 214 U.S.P.Q. 796,
825-26 (S.D. Mich. 1982).
187. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1982).
188. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has replaced the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals and now has jurisdiction over all patent, copyright and trade secret
appeals. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 41, 1292 (c)(2) (1982).
189. See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S.
63 (1972); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Gelnovatch, 595 F.2d 32
(C.C.P.A. 1979).
190. Bender, supra note 73, at 69-70.
191. Systematic Tool & Mach. Co. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 390 F. Supp. 178, 197-98
(E.D. Pa. 1975), exceptions denied, 409 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Pa. 1976), rev'd on other grounds,
555 F.2d 342 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 857 (1977).
192. Decca, Ltd. v. United States, 544 F.2d 1070, 1079 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
193. Id. at 1080-81. A dedicated machine is a computer with one built in program which
is able to perform only one task or function.
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The defendant in an infringement action has a number of defenses
available to him. An attack on the validity of the patent is probably the
most important and successful defense.' 94 Although a patent is presumed
valid, " ' the presumption is not particularly strong. Software patents are
particularly vulnerable to this defense because of the history of uncer-
tainty surrounding the patentability of software. Other defenses include
abandonment,' 9 6 use of the patent in violation of the antitrust laws,' 97
laches, 98 and permission to make, use, or sell the patentee's invention.'99
In addition, the patent process is inherently long and expensive, and
the uncertainty surrounding software patents in general exacerbates this
problem. Furthermore, the limited lifespan of most software and the ap-
parent unavailability of patent protection for the majority of software
makes patent protection unsuited for most cases. In the unusual case where
software can meet the requirements of statutory subject matter, novelty,
and nonobviousness, and where the expected lifespan of the software is
relatively long and the value of the software relatively high, patent pro-
tection may be worth the time and expense, but this is not usually the case.
D. Compatibility of Copyright, Trade Secret, and Patent Protection
The system of intellectual property law in force in the United States
today does not seem to be designed to allow the owner of such property
to obtain more than one type of protection at a time. The system seems
to rest upon the assumption that all intellectual property will fit neatly
within a particular category, and that the protection provided within the
chosen category will be adequate. Thus, obtaining one type of protection
will often preclude recourse to another type of protection. For this reason,
it is necessary to examine the compatibility of each type of protection
with each of the other types.
1. Copyright and Trade Secret
When the Copyright Act of 1976 was passed, there was some ques-
tion as to whether section 301 preempted trade secret protection for items
which were granted copyright protection. 90° Section 301 states that
194. See Bender, supra note 73, at 69-70.
195. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1982).
196. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(c), 282 (1982); see also Ransburg Electro-Coating Corp. v. Nord-
son Corp., 293 F. Supp. 448, 484 (N.D. I1. 1968).
197. In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litig., 541 F.2d 1127, 1130 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977).
198. Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Eastman Kodak Co., 616 F.2d 1315, 1325 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1014 (1980).
199. Anthony Co. v. Perfection Steel Body Co., 315 F.2d 138, 141 (6th Cir. 1963).
200. Warrington Assocs., Inc. v. Real-Time Eng'g Sys., 522 F. Supp. 367, 369 (N.D.
111. 1981).
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copyright protection preempts all state law remedies which are "equivalent"
to the exclusive rights given to a copyright holder in copyrightable sub-
ject matter. The problem was whether the rights protected by copyright
were equivalent to the rights protected by trade secret. Both House of
Representatives Report No. 1307 and the Final Report of the National
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works concluded
that section 301 does not preempt trade secret protection,2" and the re-
cent cases are in agreement. 2 ' The argument against preemption of trade
secret protection is that trade secret and copyright really protect different
things. Trade secret protects ideas, whereas copyright protects only the
expression of ideas. Furthermore, trade secret protects against use and
disclosure, whereas copyright only protects against copying and distribu-
tion. Since trade secret and copyright protect different things, they are
not equivalent; therefore, section 301 does not preempt trade secret
protection.
Even if copyright protection does not preempt state trade secret pro-
tection altogether, copyright registration can create problems for the pro-
tection of software under trade secret law. Registration may destroy the
secrecy required for trade secret protection because registered works are
deposited with the Copyright Office and the Library of Congress and are
available for public inspection." 3
It may be possible to register a program without destroying secrecy
by means of the Copyright Office regulation which allows an exemption
from the Library of Congress deposit requirement for a computer pro-
gram when the program is published only in machine readable form"
and when identifying materials are submitted to the Copyright Office in
lieu of the entire source code. The identifying materials which must be
submitted consist of the first and last twenty-five pages of the source code
and the page containing the copyright notices. The code can sometimes
be arranged so that the first and last twenty-five pages contain only
nonsecret information which will not destroy the secrecy of the trade secret,
but in the case of short programs, even the identifying materials require-
ment may require the deposit of all or substantially all of the source code.
Attempts to prevent compromise of trade secret protection via copyright
registration have also resulted in the registration and deposit of only the ob-
201. H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-24 (1980); CONTU REPORT, supra
note 57, at 18.
202. GCA Corp. v. Chance, 217 U.S.P.Q. 718, 722-23 (N.D. Cal. 1981); M. Bryce &
Assocs. v. Gladstone, 107 Wis. 2d 241, 256-58, 319 N.W.2d 907, 914-15 (Ct. App. 1982).
203. 17 U.S.C. § 408 (1982). Although the Copyright Act of 1976 does not require registra-
tion for copyright protection, id. § 302, registration is a prerequisite for an infringement
suit, id. § 411, and a certificate of registration issued within five years of first publication
is prima facie proof of ownership and the validity of the copyright in such a suit. id. § 410.
204. Registration of claims to Copyright, 37 C.F.R. § 202.19(c)(5) (1983).
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ject code for a program. While the Copyright Office will accept object code
for registration, it will only register such programs under the "rule of doubt,"
which means that the Copyright Office has not examined the work to see
if it is copyrightable subject matter." 5 The effect of the rule of doubt is unclear
and has not yet been addressed by the courts.
A third method of protecting secrecy consists of a request for secure
deposit for software similar to that which has been allowed for standard-
ized tests. Such a request has been denied by the Copyright Office.21 6
In summary, the only sure registration of a computer program is the sub-
mission of at least the first and last twenty-five pages of the source code,
which is likely to disclose enough of the program to destroy the secrecy
required for trade secret protection.
2. Patent and Trade Secret
While it seems that copyright and trade secret protection can coexist,
at least in theory, for the same material, it is impossible to retain trade
secret protection for property which is or has been protected by patent.
The disclosure requirements for patent protection are diametrically op-
posed to the secrecy requirements for trade secret protection.20 7 Further-
more, the uncertainty surrounding patent protection for computer soft-
ware can leave a publisher or programmer without either patent or trade
secret protection after a long and expensive application process in which
some or all his secrets disclosed in the application (which is supposed
to remain confidential) are printed in the public record of the opinions
written by the courts when the denial of an application is appealed.2"8
Thus, when a patent application is denied, the applicant is caught in a
Catch-22 situation-he must either forgo his right to an appeal and give
up all hope of ever obtaining a patent, or take his appeal and hope that
his secrets will not be disclosed in an opinion or that he will be able
to seal the record before the opinion is released.
3. Copyright and Patent
Although there is little or no discussion by the courts or the com-
mentators concerning the interrelationship between copyright and patent
protection, there seems to be no impediment to the consistency of these
two types of protection for computer software. The two types of protec-
tion would protect different parts of the software-patent protection would
cover the process which the software contained while copyright would pro-
tect the expression of the idea embodied in the software-but none of
the requirements for either type of protection would preclude the existence
of any of the requirements for the other type of protection. This com-
205. COPYRIGHT OFFICE CIRCULAR R 61 (July 1983).
206. 43 Fed. Reg. 765 (Jan. 4, 1978).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 91-98 & notes 178-82.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 183-89.
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bination of protection would probably not give software that is paten-
table any greater protection than would patent protection alone because,
except for the period of protection, patent protection is much broader
than copyright protection. On the other hand, the chances of winning
a copyright infringement action currently seem to be better than the
chances of winning a patent infringement action, and the expense involved
is much less.
In summary, it appears that there are serious questions as to whether
trade secret protection can coexist with either copyright or patent protec-
tion for software. It appears that copyright and patent protection can
coexist for software. The majority of software, however, does not qualify
for patent protection, and therefore most software may be limited to a
single form of protection under the current state of the law.
III. COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS
IN THE AREA OF SOFTWARE PROTECTION
Any attempt to draft legislation to solve the problems with the cur-
rent state of the law on software protection should be preceded by a careful
evaluation of the wishes and needs of the people for whom the protec-
tion is intended and the wishes and needs of the people who use the soft-
ware and provide a market for it. For this reason, the next section will
consider the interests of programmers, developers, and publishers. The
following section will consider the reasons offered by those who copy soft-
ware and attempt to identify which of their needs and desires are legitimate
and should be recognized in software protection legislation.
A. Complaints of Programmers, Developers, and Publishers" 9
The primary complaint of programmers, developers, and publishers
is easily identified-they assert that regardless of the protection theoretically
available under the current law, it affords them little or no practical pro-
tection. In their view, software piracy is rampant and the law is doing
a terrible job of stopping it.
Copyright does nothing to protect the ideas, algorithms and logic em-
bodied in their programs. Patent protection is too expensive and too hard
to get. Trade secret protection requires the owner to monitor the use of
the program by licensees to make sure they are not misusing or disclosing
the secret, and that is an impossibility when software is mass-licensed to
hundreds or maybe even thousands of users. In addition, the uncertainty
of the effect of copyright law on trade secret protection and the lack
of a good means to protect secrecy in the registration process force them
either to weaken their copyright protection by refusing to register at all
209. Letter from Mark Pelczarski, President of Penguin Software, to Mary Jensen (Nov.
17, 1983) (discussing complaints of programmers, developers, and publishers).
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or by registering only the object code under the "rule of doubt," or to
further weaken their trade secret protection by depositing at least fifty
pages of source code with the Copyright Office. Similarly, the uncertainty
of obtaining patent protection and the risk of disclosure in appeals (even
where protection is ultimatley denied) force them to risk loss of trade
secret protection in order to pursue the mere possibility of patent protec-
tion. In short, none of the various systems provides enough protection,
and any attempt to combine protection schemes carries with it the risk
of jeopardizing what little protection is available.
Furthermore, even if there is a clear violation of rights in software
conferred by the existing law, it is prohibitively expensive to enforce such
rights through litigation. The collection of evidence is too difficult, 10 the
law is too uncertain, and the number of reasonably competent lawyers
in the area is too small. All of these factors make litigation very expen-
sive, and the damage awards when a case is won rarely even meet the
cost of litigation."' The criminal sections of the copyright law and the
Fair Trade Practices Act do little to mitigate the financial burdens of
enforcement because the Justice Department will not prosecute any case
which involves less than $100,000 of pirated software.2
In the face of current legal remedies which seem almost useless, pro-
grammers, developers, and publishers have resorted to self-help in an at-
tempt to stop copying. They have resorted to software locks and hard-
ware locks which make software more difficult to copy,"1 3 allow it to
run on only one machine, or cause it to self-destruct when an attempt
is made to copy it. But even these measures are not working. Anything
that can be encrypted by a human being can be unencrypted by a human
being and a computer.214
Software developers need reasonable and economically feasible access
to the legal system to enforce the rights given to them under any soft-
ware protection legislation. Severe penalties, including punitive damages
and liberal attorney fee awards, would help to make such cases economic-
ally feasible. Large awards would also provide the financing to offer big
rewards to users, dealers and others in the industry who have evidence
which would help developers prove their cases. Severe penalties would
also encourage prosecutors to enforce the criminal sections of a software
protection law.
210. See Woodhead, The Software Pirates Possess Very Big Teaspoons, INFOWORLD,
Mar. 22, 1982, at 52, 57.
211.. Grout, Piracy-A Serious Threat or an Unfounded Fear?, MICROCOMPUTING, July
1982, at 76, 78-79.
212. Wollman, Software Piracy and Protection, POPULAR COMPUTING, Apr. 1982, at 98,
99.
213. See Shea, Thwarting Software Pirates: New Encryption Products, INFOWORLD, Sept.
27, 1982, at 10.
214. See Stein, License to Own Computers-Projections of a Paranoid?, INFoWORLD,
Oct. 3, 1983, at 37.
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B. Why Do People Copy Software?
There are two basic types of people who copy software: the boot-
legger who copies to resell at a profit and the person who copies pro-
grams for his own use or for a friend.2" ' The bootlegger copies in order
to make a bigger profit by selling a product for which he has expended
no development costs. He reaps the benefits of the developer's work
without paying the developer for what he has taken. Bootleggers threaten
the incentive of the developers and programmers to create, and the bootleg-
gers' activities offer no real benefits to the public which can be balanced
against the public's interest in giving programmers and developers an
economic incentive to create. " 6 Legislation to protect software must pro-
vide practical protection to developers and programmers against the ac-
tions of bootleggers.
The consumer's reasons for copying differ from those of the boot-
legger. A survey of recent microcomputer literature reveals at least eight
reasons why consumers copy software; these reasons range from providing
backup protection for easily destroyed software on floppy disks to ob-
taining revenge for the lack of support, poor quality and restrictive licens-
ing tactics used in mass marketing software today.
Some users copy software in order to remove copy protection schemes
so that they can list the code and learn from it. As one user in a recent
publication lamented: "Perhaps the early software wasn't entirely bug free
nor particularly elegant, but it was entirely open to the user . . . to learn
from . * . ."I" Copying for nonprofit educational purposes which does
not unduely hamper incentives for creativity has never been the type of
copying which the law has sought to prohibit."1 8 The copy protection
schemes which programmers and developers have resorted to in default
of adequate legal protection, however, have virtually eliminated the educa-
tional value of software for those seeking to become computer literate.
The purpose of the Copyright and Patent Clause of the United States
Constitution was to further the public good " 9 by encouraging the crea-
tion of works and things which would ultimately make the benefit of the
authors' and inventors' ability available to all. In order to make the works
of the inventors available to the public, the patent laws require the inven-
tor to disclose information concerning his invention in his patent applica-
215. See Remer, Legal.Expert on Software Theft: The Piranhas Versus True Pirates,
IN FOWORLD, Mar. 22, 1982, at 40, 40.
216. The dealers who make bootleg copies of software to bundle with hardware packages
to make the deal look better and encourage hardware sales fit within this category. See
Zoso, Expanding Software Libraries for Almost Nothing, INFOWORLD, May 2, 1983, at 54.
217. Easterling, The Issue Is Really Consumers' Rights, Not Piracy, INFOWORLD Mar.
22, 1982, at 56.
218. For a discussion of the fair use doctrine, see supra text accompanying notes 44-47.
219. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
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tion, which is a public record open to inspection.22 The copyright law
has never required disclosure in exchange for protection because, until
very recently, the form in which copyrightable works were published was
always understandable to the human eye or ear. Since the primary pur-
pose of most works protected by copyright is still direct communication
with human beings, there is usually no need to require disclosure to allow
people to learn from the works-the works are already in a form that
can be seen or heard directly by humans because such a format is necessary
to achieve their purpose. The primary purpose of software, however, is
not to communicate with people, but to instruct a machine to do what
some person wants it to do. There is no inherent need in software, as
in other copyrightable works, to publish it in a form that can be directly
seen or heard by humans and which will allow people to learn from it.
Since there is no such inherent need with respect to software, if the public
education purpose of the Copyright and Patent Clause is to be fulfilled
by the protection of software as a form of intellectual property, the law
must impose a disclosure requirement in any software protection scheme
just as it has imposed a disclosure requirement in the patent scheme.
Another reason for copying software is that copying software is a
necessary step in modifying it. One of the primary advantages of the
microcomputer is the ease with which a machine may be custom tailored
to the needs of a particular user through minor modifications of
software.22 ' The sheer flexibility of microcomputing has led to an ocean
of peripheral devices designed to meet a wide variety of specific needs.
The speed at which the microcomputer industry is advancing makes it
virtually impossible for software developers to ensure that their software
will be compatible with the myriad of peripherals existing when the soft-
ware is published, much less the new ones which will continue to flood
the market. The software-peripheral incompatibility problem increases the
user's need to personally modify the software which he possesses and,
therefore, increases his need to copy software in the modification
process. 2 Software also frequently needs to be modified because, unfor-
tunately, programs are often sold with bugs or problems which the sellers
are either unable or unwilling to fix; therefore, the buyer needs to have
access to the software to modify and debug it.223 All of the problems
created by the users' need to modify would be eased, if not cured, by
220. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982); Rule of Practice in Patent Cases, 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.11-15
(1983).
221. See Immel, Is Software Piracy Justified?, POPULAR COMPUTING, July 1983, at 48,
54; Koetke, Ongoing Search for Software, KILOBAUD MICROCOMPUTIrIG, Mar. 1982, at 172,
174.
222. See Militello, Open Discussion-Seeing Double Red, SOFTALK, July 1983, at 38;
Shannon, Open Discussion-Shakedown Time, SOFTALK, Sept. 1983, at 35.
223. See Freiberger, Investigation Culls Unorthodox Views from the Pirate's Cove, IN-
FOWORLD, Mar. 22, 1982, at 45, 45.
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provisions in a software protection law requiring disclosure by the
developer of the software so that others could learn from it. The same
openness which would allow learning, i.e., disclosure of source code, would
also give the user the necessary information to modify the software.
Disclosure of the source code would also discourage the many copy pro-
tection schemes used today which make modification inconvenient and
difficult.
A third reason for permitting consumer copying is also an inherent
result of the hardware design and marketing practices used in the
microcomputer industry. Programs are invariably sold on floppy disks
which hold a limited amount of data. If a user's application requires ac-
cess to large amounts of data or rapid access time when using the pro-
gram, he must find a way to transfer the program from the single density
floppy disks to double density floppy disks or hard disks. This transfer
cannot be accomplished without copying the program.224 This problem
can also be reduced or solved by provisions in software protection legisla-
tion, such as disclosure requirements, which discourage copy protection
schemes.
Another critical problem for users is the ease with which software
can be inadvertently destroyed. It is very easy to write data on top of
the software, thereby destroying it, simply by making a typographical er-
ror in the command which writes the data file. Moreover, the less ex-
perienced the user, the more likely this type of error is to occur. This
phenomenon has created serious problems in schools where the users are
often very young children.22 In addition, any data, including any type
of software, which is stored on any type of disk is subject to the many
hazards of disk storage. Backup copies of everything are desirable and
often a necessity. 2 '6 The obvious solution to the easily destructible storage
medium problem is to permit users to make backup copies of everything
so that a user has another usable copy if the copy currently in use is
inadvertently destroyed. Users should not be permitted to use these backups
on additional machines while the original is in use or to sell or give away
the backups while retaining the originals or vice versa; backups are meant
to be used only in case the original copy becomes unusable. Legislation
which discourages the copy protection schemes currently employed by pro-
grammers and developers ' would remove the problems facing users in
making backup copies or trying to get developers to supply backups for
copy protected software.
224. Freiberger, Pirates Bedevil Angry and Frustrated Software Vendors, INFoWOFRLD,
Mar. 22, 1982, at 31, 38; Immel, supra note 221, at 54; Smith, Open Discussion-Caught
in a Bind, SOFTALK, Apr. 1983, at 46, 46-48.
225. Hoover & Gould, The Pirating of Computer Programs: A Survey of Software Pro-
ducers, EDUC. TECH., Oct. 1982, at 23, 24.
226. See Houston, Open Discussion-Nibble Quibble, SOFTALK, Mar. 1983, at 36.
227. See supra text accompanying notes 209-14.
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The remaining reasons offered by users for copying software seem
less deserving of recognition and protection than the reasons discussed
thus far. Three of the remaining reasons relate to convenience and
monetary savings. First, many business users think that it is unreasonable
to expect them to purchase a separate copy of each software package
they use for each machine they own.28 While multicopy discounts similar
to volume discounts for books, tools, and equipment would probably be
desirable, this complaint of users seems to be a supply/demand market
type problem, and its solution should probably be left to the free market.
Educational buyers are already making some progress in obtaining dis-
counts for volume buying or authorized copying for multimachine use
from dealers and developers.229
The next justification users offer for copying software is that there
are no reasonable means available for evaluating a piece of software to
see if it meets a user's needs before he pays a substantial sum23 for a
software package which is not even warranted to boot up and run.23" ' While
this problem seems to be at least partially a problem that should be
resolved in the market, the usual disclaimer of all warranties, including
the implied warranty of merchantibility, is unconscionable in a consumer
mass market such as the current software market. Legislation which ex-
tends protection to software should demand at least a minimum of com-
mercial responsibility in return for the protection by prohibiting such
disclaimers. Once unconscionable disclaimers have been prohibited, the
remainder of the presale evaluation problem should be left to be worked
out in the free marketplace. The battle on this issue has already resulted
in software rental firms which rent software for evaluation232 and marketing
schemes where the seller requires only a nominal sale price and requests
228. Freiberger, supra note 223, at 45; Immel, supra note 221, at 50-51.
229. See Zientara, Betamax Offers Software-License Plan to Schools, INFOWORLD, Oct.
24, 1983, at 5.
230. See Unabashed Pirate Summarizes His Creed, Divulges His Source, INFoWoRLD,
Mar. 22, 1982, at 35.
231. The standard disclaimer of warranty on software packages reads as follows:
[Developer] makes no warranties, either express or implied, with respect to this
manual or with respect to the software described in this manual, its quality,
performance, merchantability, or fitness for any particular purpose. [Developer's]
software is sold or licensed "as is." The entire risk as to its quality and perfor-
mance is with the buyer. Should the programs prove defective following their
purchase, the buyer, (and not [Developer], its distributor, or its retailer) assumes
the entire cost of all necessary servicing, repair, or correction and any incidental
or consequential damages. In no event will [Developer] be liable for direct, in-
direct, incidental, or consequential damages resulting from any defect in the soft-
ware, even if [Developer] has been advised of the possibility of such damages.
APPLE COMPUTER INC., THE DOS MANUAL front inside cover (1981).
232. These rental agents often offer a rebate on rental if the software is purchased.




a more substantial contribution if the buyer finds the software useful.2 "
When the sole justification offered for copying is saving money,23
the argument for recognizing and protecting such a justification is not
convincing and should receive little or no consideration in a legislative
scheme to protect software. Intellectual property protection schemes are
based upon the theory that securing a financial reward for the developer
will create an incentive for persons to develop products. Any recognition
of copying solely to save money for the users of the product, beyond
allowing backup copies to prevent an intolerable continuing financial
burden on the user, seriously undermines this theory. Proper pricing levels
ought to be left to be worked out in the free market.
Users sometimes resort to copying as a means of revenge upon
developers for marketing techniques which result in high prices, no war-
ranties, no support, and poor quality software. The users claim that they
cannot afford to pursue their complaints through legal channels and that
this type of revenge is the only way they have of retaliating against the
unjust practices of software developers.2" Although users have a legitimate
complaint that the cost of pursuing a legal solution is so great as to be
no solution at all, revenge through copying is not the solution. Software
protection legislation ought to provide reasonable and practical remedies
to users against developers and others who do not live up to their con-
tractual and warranty obligations. Such remedies are a fair price for the
developers to pay in exchange for a practical remedy against unauthor-
ized copiers. From the users' point of view, provisions for liberal attorney
fees ought to enable them to solve their disputes with developers through
legal action and should help to eliminate this cause for copying.
The final reason for copying described in recent microcomputer
literature is the challenge involved in breaking a copy protection scheme.
As long as software remains copy protected, this reason for copying soft-
ware will remain. The disclosure provisions suggested above would remove
the incentive for copy protection and would probably indirectly result in
a reduction of copying for the sake of challenge.
In summary, software protection legislation can probably eliminate
most of the problems with software protection and copying under the
current law while furthering the legitimate interests of both developers
and users. Software protection legislation can achieve this by (1) providing
for disclosure of source code in accord with the open disclosure theories
of intellectual property protection under the Copyright and Patent Clause
of the Constitution; (2) discouraging copy protection schemes; (3) pro-
233. See Markoff, Word Processing Package Costs $10 Under New Marketing Scheme,
INFOWORLD, Sept. 19, 1983, at 3.
234. See Jones, Open Discussion-A "True" Pirate Speaks, SOFTALK, June 1983, at 44.
235. See Pournelle, Software Publishers vs. Piracy, INFOWORLD, June 7, 1982, at 31.
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hibiting disclaimers of warranty of merchantibility and fitness; and (4)
providing economically feasible resort to the legal system for both
developers and users for dispute resolution. Severe penalties, including
punitive damages and liberal attorney fee awards in cases where a developer
or prosecutor successfully prosecutes illegal copying of software, should
at least reduce copying for profit and make prosecution of such cases
feasible.
Mary Brandt Jensen
1LOUISIANA LA W RE VIEW
APPENDIX
A Suggested Softright Act*
§ 101. Definitions
As used in this Act, the following terms and their variant forms shall
have the following meanings:
(a) "Copies" are material objects in which software is fixed
by any method now known or later developed and from which
the software can be-
(i) perceived or otherwise communicated to a human being,
either directly or with the aid of a machine, device or other
software;
(ii) reproduced; or
(iii) used directly or with the aid of a machine, device, or
other software to cause a computer to perform an operation. The
term "copies" includes the material object in which the software
is first fixed and original copies of the software.
(b) Software is "created" when it is fixed in a copy for the
first time. When software is prepared over a period of time, the
portion of it that has been fixed in a copy at any particular time
constitutes the software as of that time. When the software has
been prepared in different versions, each version constitutes a
separate piece of software.
(c) "Derivative software" is software based upon one or more
preexisting pieces of software, such as a translation of software
into another source language, documentation describing software,
or any other form in which software may be recast, transformed,
or adapted.
(d) "Distribution" is the transfer of a copy of any software
by sale, lease, license, gift or any other means of conveyance with
or without consideration.
(e) "Distribution for profit" is the transfer of a copy of any
software by sale, lease, license, or any other means of conveyance
in exchange for consideration.
(f) Software is "fixed" in a tangible medium of storage when
its embodiment in a copy, by or under the authority of the author,
* The form and much of the language of this Act are based on the Copyright Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541. The substance is, however, different in many
respects from the Copyright Act of 1976.
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is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived
or otherwise communicated to a human being, either directly or
with the aid of a machine, device or other software, reproduced
or used directly or with the aid of a machine, device, or other
software to cause a computer to perform an operation.
(g) The terms "including" and "such as" are illustrative and
not limitative.
(h) A "lawful possessor' is any person who has acquired a
copy of any software by creating it, by hiring another person to
create it as software made for hire, or by means of any lawful
distribution.
(i) An "original copy" is a copy of software received in a lawful
distribution. It does not include any copy made under the provi-
sions of sections 107 and 108.
() "Original software" is software which is independently
created and is not substantially similar to any currently registered
Class A software.
(k) "Private use" is any use other than for distribution.
(1) "Software" is any computer program, whether in source,
object, or machine code, or any documentation describing a com-
puter program, such as flow charts, manuals, and user's aids.
(m) "Software made for hire" is-
(1) software prepared by an employee within the
scope of his or her employment, or
(2) software specially ordered or commissioned, if the
parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by
them that the software shall be considered to be software
made for hire.
(n) "Software of the United States Government" is software
prepared by an officer or employee of the United States Govern-
ment as part of that person's official duties.
(o) "Softright owner," with respect to any one of the exclusive
rights comprised in a softright, refers to the owner of that par-
ticular right.
(p) "Source code" is the text of a computer program in the
highest level language in which it was composed; such as BASIC
or PASCAL. Source code includes assembler language if the pro-
gram was originally composed in assembler language.
(q) "Substantially similar software" is software which uses the
same ideas, algorithms, and techniques to perform the same or
a similar task or to produce the same or similar results as the
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software to which it is being compared. Software which has
qualified as Class A software is presumed not be be substantially
similar to any preexisting software.
(r) A "transfer of softright ownership" is an assignment, mort-
gage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or
hypothecation of a softright or of any of the exclusive rights com-
prised in a softright, whether or not it is limited in time or place
of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license.
§ 102. Subject matter of softright: In general
(a) Softright protection subsists, in accordance with this Act, in original
software fixed in any tangible storage medium, now known or later
developed, subject to the following conditions:
(1) a softright notice in compliance with section 301 is affixed
to the software;
(2) the software is registered in compliance with sections 401
through 403 before it is distributed for profit;
(3) a softright registration number is affixed to the software
if it is distributed for profit;
(4) after the software is classified as Class B software, the soft-
right owner provides source code to lawful possessors of the soft-
ware who request it, provided, a reasonable fee suffient to cover
the costs of handling such requests may be charged for this ser-
vice, which obligation can be satisfied by distributing the pro-
gram in listable source code format;
(5) neither the softright owner nor his agents shall attempt to
disclaim liability under redhibition or the implied warranties of
fitness and merchantability; and
(6) the preceding conditions are subject to the provisions of
section 201 if the software is created by an author who is domiciled
in a country other than the United States.
(b) Softright protection shall be divided into two categories- Class
A protection and Class B protection:
(1) Class A protection shall be extended to software which is
innovative. To be considered innovative, the software must-
(i) use ideas, algorithms, or techniques or a combina-
tion of ideas, algorithms, and techniques not generally
known or used in the software industry;
(ii) produce a result not produced by any existing
software; or
(iii) automate a task which has not been automated
by any existing software.
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(2) Class B protection shall be extended to software-
(i) which was originally classified as Class A soft-
ware after the period of Class A protection has expired, or
(ii) which was independently created and would not
infringe upon the exclusive rights of any currently
registered Class A software.
Comments
(a) Refer to section 105 for the exclusive rights extended to Class
A and Class B software.
(b) The first and third conditions are designed to make the informa-
tion necessary to check proper registration readily available on software
distributed for profit.
(c) The second condition is designed to encourage registration so that
the Softright Office will have a reasonably complete file of preexisting
software with which to compare applications for Class A protection to
ensure that Class A protection will not be granted for software substan-
tially similar to preexisting software.
(d) The fourth condition is designed to ensure disclosure which will
allow people to learn from software and to modify it. It is also designed
to encourage marketing of Class B software, which will include the ma-
jority of software on the market at any given time, in uncopyprotected
formats which will ease modification and the making of backup copies.
Class A software is exempted from this condition because it is recognized
that secrecy is vital to the head start type of protection extended to in-
novative software. This does not significantly compromise the goals of
this condition since all Class A software becomes Class B software after
it has been on the market for one year.
(e) The dual classification scheme allows greater protection for in-
novative software, thereby providing an added incentive for creative efforts.
(f) The requirements that software must meet to qualify as "in-
novative" are less stringent than the patent requirement of novelty;
therefore, more programs and other software should be able to meet these
requirements than have been able to meet the patent requirement. These
requirements are based upon the trade secret requirement of novelty
because secrecy is necessary during the Class A protection period.
§ 103. Subject matter of softright: Derivative software
(a) The subject matter of softright as described in section 102 includes
derivative software, but protection for software employing preexisting
material in which softright subsists does not extend to any part of the
software in which such material has been used unlawfully.
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(b) The softright in derivative software extends only to the material
contributed by the author of such derivative software, as distinguished
from the preexisting material employed in the software, and does not im-
ply any exclusive right in the preexisting material. The softright in such
software is independent of, and does not affect or enlarge the scope, dura-
tion, ownership, or subsistence of, any softright protection in the preex-
isting material.
§ 104. Subject matter of softright: United States government software
Softright protection under this Act is not available for any work of
the United States Government, but the United States Government is not
precluded from receiving or holding softrights transferred to it by assign-
ment, bequest, or otherwise.
§ 105. Exclusive rights in softrighted software
(a) Subject to sections 106 throught 109, the owner of softright in
Class A software under this Act has the exclusive right to do and to
authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the softrighted software in copies;
(2) to distribute copies of the softrighted software or software
which is substantially similar to the innovative aspect of the Class
A software;
(3) to distribute derivative software based upon the softrighted
software.
(b) Subject to sections 106 through 109, the owner of softright in Class
B software under this Act has the exclusive right to do and to authorize
any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the softrighted software in copies;
(2) to distribute copies of the softrighted software;
(3) to distribute derivative software based upon the softrighted
software.
Comments
The advantage of Class A protection is that it allows the softright
owner to prevent substantially similar software from being marketed at
all during the heightened protection period. This will give innovative soft-
ware a one year period in which to establish a market free of competition
from similar software. See section 501. The extra market share this pro-




§ 106. Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 105, the fair use of soft-
righted software, including such use by reproduction in copies, for pur-
poses such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship,
or research, is not an infringment of softright. In determining whether
the use of software in any particular case is a fair use, the factors to
be considered shall include-
(a) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(b) whether the software being used is a computer program or
documentation describing a computer program;
(c) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in rela-
tion to the softrighted piece as a whole; and
(d) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the softrighted software.
Comments
This section is not intended to allow teachers to make multiple copies
of entire programs for multimachine use in the classroom because such
copying would substantially reduce the market for educational software,
decreasing the profits and therefore the incentive to create good educa-
tional software.
§ 107. Limitation on exclusive rights: Distribution by libraries and
archives
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 105, it is not an in-
fringement of softright for a library or archives, or any of its employees
acting within the scope of their employment, to reproduce no more than
one copy of a piece of software currently in the collection of the library
or archives, or to distribute such copy, under the conditions specified by
this section if-
(1) the reproduction is made without any purpose of direct or
indirect commercial advantage;
(2) the collections of the library or archives are-
(i) open to the public, or
(ii) available not only to researchers affiliated with
the library or archives or with the institution of which
it is a part, but also to other persons doing research in
the specialized field; and
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(3) the reproduction or distribution of the software includes a
notice of softright.
(b) The rights of reproduction and distribution under this section apply
to a copy of softrighted software duplicated solely for purposes of preser-
vation and security or for any of the following purposes:
(1) for deposit for research use in another library or archives
of the type described in subsection (a) (2) of this section if the
library or archives has, after a reasonable effort, determined that
an unused copy cannot be obtained at a fair price;
(2) for replacement of a copy which is damaged, deteriorating,
destroyed, lost, or stolen.
(c) The rights of reproduction and distribution under this section apply
to a copy of softrighted software duplicated by a library or archives solely
for purposes of lending to its patrons, provided that the total number
of copies in circulation at any one time does not exceed the number of
original copies which the library has lawfully acquired.
(d) Nothing in this section-
(1) shall be construed to impose liability for softright infringe-
ment upon a library or archives or its employees for the unsuper-
vised use of reproducing equipment located on it premises, pro-
vided that such equipment displays a notice that the making of
a copy may be subject to the softright law;
(2) excuses a person who uses such reproducing equipment from
liability for softright infringement for any such act, or for any
later use of such copy if it exceeds fair use as provided by sec-
tion 106;
(3) in any way affects the right of fair use as provided by sec-
tion 106.
§ 108. Limitations on exclusive rights: Rights of a lawful possessor of
a copy of softrighted software
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 105, it is not an in-
fringement for a lawful possessor of a copy of softrighted software to-
(1) create derivative software based upon the softrighted soft-
ware in his possession for private use, or
(2) reproduce the software in copies for any of the following
purposes or similar purposes:
(i) modification of the software for private use;




(iii) archiving copies to replace the original copy
should it become damaged or destroyed;
(iv) any other purpose authorized by the softright
owner or his agents.
(b) Nothing in subsection (a) of this section shall be interpreted to
give a lawful possessor who creates derivative computer programs the right
to distribute such derivative programs without the consent of the softright
owner of the software upon which the derivative program is based. A
lawful possessor who creates derivative documentation shall have the right
to distribute such derivative documentation on a nonprofit basis, in let-
ters, newsletters, periodicals and other forms of communication. A lawful
possessor who creates derivative documentation shall not have the right
to distribute such derivative documentation for profit without the con-
sent of the softright owner of the software upon which the derivative
documentation is based.
(c) Nothing in subsection (a) of this section shall be interpreted to
give a lawful possessor the right to distribute any copy of softrighted soft-
ware made under the provisions of that subsection.
(d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent a lawful
possessor from hiring another person to create derivative software for his
private use. Such derivative software shall become the property of the
lawful possessor, and neither the lawful possessor nor the author of the
derivative software shall have the right to distribute it except in compliance
with subsection (b) of this section.
(e) The rights granted to a lawful possessor by this section may not
be limited by contract.
Comments
(a) This section recognizes and permits the copying of software in
those instances in which it is necessary for the efficient use of computers
and software which is mass marketed to consumers with customized needs
and unstandardized equipment.
(b) The provisions on distribution are designed to ensure that a soft-
right owner receives a fair return for his efforts without stifling the free
exchange of information among users.
§ 109. Limitations on exclusive rights: Transfer of an original copy by
a lawful possessor
(a) Nothwithstanding the provisions of section 105, the lawful possessor
of an original copy of softrighted software is entitled to sell or otherwise
transfer an original copy of softrighted software without the authority
of the softright owner.
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(b) Copies or derivative software made in accordance with section
108 may not be transferred except in accordance with the provisions of
that section.
(c) Upon the sale or other transfer of an original copy of softrighted
software, the lawful possessor shall destroy all copies or derivative soft-
ware made under the provisions of section 108 unless he retains at least
one original copy of the software in his lawful possession.
Comments
This section is designed to prevent a user from selling the original
copies and retaining the "backup copies" for his own use while allowing
the user who wishes to upgrade or change software completely to recoup
part of his investment by selling the software he no longer intends to use.
§ 201. Works created by authors domiciled in a country other than the
United States
(a) Software which has never been distributed is subject to protection
in accordance with this Act without regard to the nationality or domicile
of the author.
(b) The conditions stated in subsections(a) (1)-(3) of section 102 shall
be regarded as satisfied if the universal copyright symbol, "c", is affixed
to the software and the software was first distributed in and the author
is domiciled in a country which is-
(1) a party to the Universal Copyright Convention, or
(2) covered by a Presidential copyright or softright proclamation.
(c) If the software is created by an author domiciled in a country
which is a party to the Universal Copyright Convention and the software
was first distributed in such a country, the software shall be protected
by the provisions of this Act for the period stated by this Act. When
the period stated by this Act has expired, the software shall be protected
by the law of copyright as it existed with respect to software on the date
this Act was enacted until the minimum term allowed by the Universal
Copyright Convention has expired.
(d) Whenever the President finds that a particular foreign nation ex-
tends intellectual property protection to software by authors who are na-
tionals or domiciliaries of the United States or to software that is first
published in the United States on substantially the same basis as that on
which the foreign nation extends protection to software of its own na-
tionals and domiciliaries and software first published in that nation, the
President may by proclamation extend protection under this Act to soft-
ware of which one or more of the authors is, on the date of first distribu-
tion, a national, domiciliary, or sovereign authority of that nation, or
which was first distributed in that nation. The President may revise, sus-
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pend, or revoke any such proclamation or impose any conditions or
limitaions on protection under a proclamation.
Comments
This section is designed to meet the requirements of compliance with
the copyright treaties to which the United States is a party, since many
other countries attempt to protect software through copyright.
§ 301. Notice of softright
(a) General requirement-All copies of software protected by this Act
shall have affixed to them a notice of softright protection in accordance
with the provisions of this section.
(b) Form of notice-The notice appearing on the copies shall consist
of the following three elements:
(1) the symbol "(S)" (the letter "S" enclosed in parentheses),
or the word "Softright";
(2) the year of first distribution or the year of creation if the
software has never been distributed; and
(3) the name of the owner of softright in the software, an ab-
breviation by which the name can be recognized, or a generally
known alternative designation of the owner.
(c) Position of notice-
(1) in the case of a computer program, the notice shall be
placed-
(i) in a position which will cause it to be displayed
on the first screen when the program is run and on the
first page of the source code when it is listed, and
(ii) on the outside surface of the storage medium in
which the program is stored in a position and manner
which gives reasonable notice of the claim of softright;
(2) in the case of documentation stored on paper, the notice
shall be placed on the verso of the title page or on the first page
if there is no title page or verso of the title page;
(3) in the case of documentation which is viewed with the aid
of a machine, the notice shall be placed so that it appears on
the first screen which is viewed;
(4) in the case of any software not described above, the notice
shall be placed on the software in a manner and location which
gives reasonable notice of the claim of softright;
(5) additional notices may be added in any iocation or position.
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§ 302. Effect of distribution without notice
(a) Effect on validity of softright-The omission of the softright notice
on distributed copies of software invalidates the softright and makes the
software public domain software, unless-
(1) the notice has been omitted from no more than a relatively
small number of copies and a reasonable effort is made to add
notice to all copies that are distributed after the omission has been
discovered, or
(2) the notice has been omitted in violation of an express re-
quirement in writing that, as a condition of the softright owner's
authorization of the distribution of copies, the distributed copies
bear the prescribed notice.
(b) Effect of omission on innocent infringers-Any person who in-
nocently infringes a softright, in reliance upon a copy distributed by or
under an authorization from the softright owner from which the softright
notice has been omitted or removed, incurs no liability for actual or
statutory damages under section 704 for any infringing acts committed
before he receives notice that registration for the software has been made
under sections 401 through 403, if such person proves that he or she was
misled by the omission of notice.
(c) Removal of notice-Protection under this title is not affected by
the removal, destruction, or obliteration of the notice, without the
authorization of the softright owner, from any distributed copies.
Comments
This section is designed to ensure that all users and potential infringers
are notified when software is protected by softright.
§ 303. Notice of softright: Error in name or date
(a) Error in name-Where the person named in the softright notice
on copies distributed by authority of the softright owner is not the owner
of softright, the validity and ownership of the softright are not affected.
In such a case, however, any person who innocently begins an undertak-
ing that infringes the softright has a complete defense to any action for
such infringement if such person proves that he or she was misled by
the notice and began the undertaking in good faith under a purported
transfer or license from the person named therein, unless before the under-
taking was begun-
(1) registration for the software had been made in the name
of the owner of softright, or
(2) a document executed by the person named in the notice and
showing the ownership of the copyright had been recorded.
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The person named in the notice is liable to account to the softright
owner for all receipts from transfers or licenses purportedly made under
the softright by the person named in the notice.
(b) Error in date-When the year date in the notice on copies
distributed by authority of the softright owner is earlier than the year
in which distribution first occurred, any period computed from the year
of first distribution under section 502 is to be computed from the year
date in the notice. Where the year date in the notice on copies distributed
by authority of the softright owner is more than one year later than the
year in which distribution first occurred, the software is considered to
have been distributed without any notice and is governed by the provi-
sions of section 302.
(c) Omission of name or date-Where copies distributed by authority
of the copyright owner contain no name or no date that could reasonably
be considered a part of the notice, the software is considered to have
been published without any notice and is governed by the provisions of
section 302.
§ 401. Softright registration in general
(a) Mandatory registration for software distributed for profit -
Distribution of software for profit prior to registration is a violation of
this Act. Each distributed copy shall constitute a separate violation.
(b) Application for registration: Class A software-An application for
softright registration for Class A software is made by submitting a com-
pleted application and fee in accordance with sections 402 and 908 to
the Softright Office, together with the following materials:
(1) a statement describing the innovative aspect of the software
for which Class A protection is sought, and
(2) (i) in the case of a computer program, a complete listing
of the source code and all accompanying documentation including
a flowchart showing the logical structure and flow of control, or
(ii) in the case of documentation, a complete listing
or eye readable copy of the software or sound recording
of the software if it is to be distributed as a sound record-
ing.
A Class A application shall be filed six months prior to the date of first
distribution. All materials submitted by a Class A applicant are to be
considered confidential and are to be kept under secure deposit for the
period of Class A protection if it is granted. If Class A protection is
denied, the application shall be considered for Class B protection.
(c) Application for registration: Class B software-An application for
softright registration for Class B software is made by submitting a com-
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pleted application and fee in accordance with sections 402 and 908 to
the Softright Office, together with the following materials:
(1) in the case of a computer program, a complete listing of
the source code and all accompanying documentation including
a flowchart showing the logical structure and flow of control, and
(2) in the case of documentation, a complete listing or eye
readable copy of the software or a complete sound recording of
the software if it is to be distributed as a sound recording.
An application for softright registration may be made in accordance with
this subsection even though the softright owner has no current intention
to distribute the software.
(d) Optional deposit of public domain software-The Softright Of-
fice is authorized to accept deposits of source code for public domain
software by the author of such software when accompanied by a state-
ment of intention to donate the software to the public domain in accor-
dance with section 405.
Comments
(a) Subsection (a) is designed to ensure that software is registered so
that the Softright Office has a reasonably complete collection of software
with which to compare applications for Class A software.
(b) The requirement that source code, documentation, and flow charts
be submitted in an application should provide the Softright Office with
sufficient information to compare Class A applications with the preex-
isting software on file and to find any substantial similarity which exists.
(c) The Softright Office may not grant provisional Class A registra-
tion before examining the software because Class A protection restricts
the rights of others to apply for either Class A or Class B protection.
Since provisional Class A registration is not viable, the Softright Office
needs a substantial period of time in which to evaluate the software before
distribution begins. Software takes a long time to develop and even longer
to debug, and any innovative aspects should be sufficiently developed six
months before the intended distribution date to allow the Softright Of-
fice time to evaluate it.
(d) Secure deposit for Class A software is essential to ensure that
it gets the head start in the market which Class A protection is designed
to provide.
(e) The effect of making distribution for profit without registration
a violation of the Act is to subject the distributor to criminal penalties
for violation of the Act under section 707(0 which imposes a fine of
$25,000 for each violation.
(f) The sanction for failing to submit the proper materials for Class
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A registration six months before the date of first distribution is either
the delay of first distribution or the forfeiture of Class A protection.
(g) Because the period of Class A protection is so short and any delay
in distribution caused by an appeal would prevent the marketing advan-
tage created by Class A protection, there is no appeal from a denial of
Class A protection. Since there is no appeal from a denial of Class A
protection and since a denied Class A application is automatically con-
verted to a Class B application, there is no reason to keep a denied Class
A application confidential.
§ 402. Application for softright registration
The application for softright registration shall be made on a form
prescribed by the Register of Softrights. This form shall include-
(a) the name and address of the softright claimant;
(b) the name and nationality or domicile of the author or
authors, and, if one or more of the authors is dead, the dates
of their deaths;
(c) in the case of a software made for hire, a statement that
it was made for hire;
(d) a brief statement of how the claimant obtained ownership
of the softright if the softright claimant is not the author;
(e) the title of the software, together with any previous or alter-
native titles under which the software has been or can be
identified;
(f) in the case of derivative software, an identification of any
preexisting software on which it is based, and a brief, general
statement of the additional material covered by the softright claim
being registered;
(g) in the case of derivative software, a signed authorization
from the softright owner of the software on which the derivative
software is based or a statement that the softright protection on
the base software has expired or otherwise has been lifted; and
(h) any other information regarded by the Register of Softrights
as bearing upon the preparation or identification of the software
or the existence, ownership, or duration of the softright.
§ 403. Registration of claim, and issuance of certificate
(a) Within five working days of receipt of a Class B application, the
Register of Softrights shall issue a provisional certificate of registration
to the applicant containing the information given in the application and
the number and date of the registration. This provisional certificate of
registration shall allow the applicant to begin distribution of the software
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for profit. However, this provisional registration shall not absolve the
registrant from liability if the provisional registration is later revoked
because it is determined that the software infringes another softright.
(b) Within six months of receiving either a Class A or Class B ap-
plication, the Register of Softrights shall complete an examination of the
material submitted and make a detemination as to whether the material
submitted constitutes softrightable subject matter.
(c) When, after examination, the Register of Softrights determines
that, in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the material deposited
constitutes softrightable Class A or Class B subject matter and that the
other legal and formal requirements of this title have been met, the Register
shall register the claim and issue to the applicant a final certificate of
registration under the seal of the Softright Office. The certificate shall
contain the information in the application, together with the number and
date of the registration.
(d) In any case in which the Register of Softrights determines that,
in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the material deposited does
not constitute softrightable subject matter or that the claim is invalid for
any other reason, the Register shall refuse to register the material, revoke
the provisional registration, if any, and notify the applicant in writing
of the reasons for such refusal.
(e) In any judicial proceedings, a final certificate of registration shall
constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the softright and of the
facts stated in the certificate.
(f) The effective date of registration is the date on which the final
certificate was issued or the date on which the provisional certicate was
issued, if one was issued.
* § 404. Registration as a prerequisite to infringement suit for undistributed
software
Before an action for infringement of softright in undistributed soft-
ware can be brought, the software must be registered and a certificate
must be issued.
§ 405. Registration of public domain software
The Register of Softrights is authorized to accept software for registra-
tion as public domain software if the softright owner submits an applica-
tion for registration in accordance with section 402, together with the
following:
(a) a certificate of donation issued by a person authorized to
administer oaths within the United States;
(b) in the case of a computer program, one complete copy of
the source code; and
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(c) in the case of documentation, a complete eye-readable copy
of the documentation or a complete sound recording of the soft-
ware if it has been or will be distributed as a sound recording.
If the software has been previously registered, only the certificate of dona-
tion and the prior registration number need be submitted.
Comments
The registration of public domain software is to be encouraged to
ensure that the Softright Office has as complete a collection of preex-
isting software as possible for comparison with Class A applications. There
is no fee for public domain registration.
§ 501. Duration of softright: Software first distributed prior to the ef-
fective date of this Act
All software first distributed prior to the effective date of this Act
shall automatically be entitled to Class B protection under this Act. The
period of softright protection shall continue for five years after the effec-
tive date of this Act. In order to remain eligible for protection under
this Act, existing software shall have one year from the date of enact-
ment of this Act to comply with all the provisions of this Act.
§ 502. Duration of softright: Software first distributed after the enact-
ment of this Act
(a) Class A protection shall continue for one year from the date of
first distribution of software which has qualified for Class A protection.
(b) Class B protection shall continue for five years from the date of
first distribution or from the expiration of Class A protection if the soft-
ware qualified for Class A protection.
§ 503. Duration of softright: Date of termination
All terms of softright provided by sections 501 and 502 run to the
end of the calandar year in which they would otherwise expire.
§ 601. Ownership of softright
(a) Initial ownership-Softright in software protected under this Act
vests initially in the author or authors of the software. The authors of
a joint work are coowners of softright in the software.
(b) Software made for hire-In the case of software made for hire,
the employer or other person for whom the software was prepared is con-
sidered the author for purposes of this Act, and, unless the parties have
expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by the parties,
the employer owns all the rights comprised in the softright.
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(c) Transfer of ownership-
(1) The ownership of a softright may be transferred in whole
or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law
and may be bequeathed by will or pass as personal property under
the applicable laws of intestate succession.
(2) Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a softright, including
any subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 105, may
be separately transferred as provided by subsection (c)(1) of this
section and separately owned. The owner of any particular ex-
clusive right is entitled, to the extent of that right, to all of the
protection and remedies accorded a softright owner by this Act.
(d) Involuntary transfer-When an individual author's ownership of
a softright or of any of the exclusive rights under a softright has not
previously been transferred voluntarily by that individual author, no ac-
tion by any governmental body or other official or organization purport-
.ing to seize, expropriate, transfer, or exercise the rights of ownership with
respect to the softright, or any of the exclusive rights of ownership with
respect to the softright shall be given effect under this Act.
§ 602. Ownership of softright distinguished from ownership of material
object
Ownership of a softright, or of any of the exclusive rights included
in a softright, is distinct from the ownership of any material object in
which the software is embodied. The transfer of ownership of any material
object, including the copy in which the software is first fixed, does not
of itself convey any softright rights in the software embodied in the ob-
ject; likewise, the transfer of ownership of a softright or of any of the
exclusive rights included in a softright does not of itself convey property
rights in any material object in the absence of an agreement to the
contrary.
§ 603. Execution of transfers of softright ownership
(a) No transfer of softright ownership, other than by operation of
law, is valid unless evidenced by an instrument of conveyance, a note
or memorandum of the transfer, or some other writing signed by the owner
of the rights conveyed or such owner's duly authorized agent.
(b) A certificate of acknowledgement is not required to effect a valid
transfer, but it is prima facie evidence of the execution of the transfer if-
(1) in the case of a transfer executed in the United States, the
certificate is issued by a person authorized to administer oaths
within the United States, or
(2) in the case of a transfer executed in a foreign country, the
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certificate is issued by a diplomatic or consular officer of the
United States, or by a person authorized to administer oaths in
the foreign country whose authority is proved by a certificate of
such an officer.
§ 604. Recordation of transfers and other documents
(a) Conditions for recordation-Any transfer of softright ownership
or other document pertaining to a softright may be recorded in the Soft-
right Office, if the document filed for recordation bears the actual signature
of the person who executed it or if it is accompanied by a sworn or of-
ficial certification that it is a true copy of the original, signed document.
(b) Certificate of recordation-Upon receipt of a document meeting
the requirements of subsection (a) of this section and of the fee required
by section 908, the Register of Softrights shall record the document and
return it with a certificate of recordation.-
(c) Recordation as constructive notice-Recordation of a document
in the Softright Office gives all persons constructive notice of the facts
stated in the recorded document if-
(1) the document or the material attached to it specifically iden-
tifies the software to which it pertains, so that, after it has been
indexed by the Register of Softrights, the document can be found
by a reasonable search under the title or registration number of
the software, and
(2) the software has been registered.
(d) Recordation as a prerequisite to infringement suit-No person
claiming by virtue of a transfer to be the owner of a softright or of any
exclusive right under a softright is entitled to institute an infringement
action under this Act until the instrument of transfer under which such
person claims has been recorded in the Softright Office, but suit may
be instituted after such recordation on a cause of action that arose before
recordation.
(e) Priority between conflicting transfers-As between two conflicting
transfers, the one executed first in time prevails if it is recorded in the
manner required to give constructive notice under subsection (c) of this
section within one month after its execution in the United States, within
two months after its execution outside the United States, or at any time
before the recordation in such manner of the later transfer. Otherwise
the later transfer prevails if recorded first in such manner, and if taken
in good faith, for valuable consideration or on the basis of a binding
promise to pay royalties, and without notice of the earlier transfer.
(f) Priority between conflicting transfer of ownership and nonexclusive
license-A nonexclusive license prevails over a conflicting transfer of soft-
right ownership, whether recorded or not, if the license is evidenced.by
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a written instrument signed by the owner of the rights licensed or such
owner's duly authorized agent, and if-
(1) the license was taken before execution of the transfer; or
(2) the license was taken in good faith before recordation of
the transfer and without notice of it.
§ 701. Infringement of softright
(a) Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the softright
owner as provided by sections 105 through 109 or who imports copies
into the United States in violation of section 801 is an infringer of the
softright.
(b) Subject to the requirements of sections 405 and 604(d), the legal
or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a softright is entitled to
institute an action for any infringement of that particular right commit-
ted while he is the owner of it. The court may require such owner to
serve written notice of the action with a copy of the complaint upon any
person shown, by the records of the Softright Office or otherwise, to
have or claim an interest in the softright, and shall require that such notice
be served upon any person whose interest is likely to be affected by a
decision in the case. The court may require the joinder, and shall permit
the intervention, of any person having or claiming an interest in the soft-
right.
§ 702. Remedies for infringement: Injunctions
(a) Any court having jurisdiction of a civil action arising under this
Act shall grant a temporary injunction on such terms as it may deem
reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a softright unless the
defendant shows-
(1) that the plaintiff is unlikely to succeed in his action, or
(2) that the plaintiff will not be unduly harmed by the failure
to grant such an injunction and that the defendant will be ir-
reparably harmed by such an injunction.
(b) An injunction granted under subsection (a) of this section may
be served anywhere in the United States on the person enjoined; it shall
be operative throughout the United States and shall be enforceable, by
proceedings in contempt or otherwise, by any United States court having
jurisdiction over that person. When requested by any other court in which
enforcement of the injunction is sought, the clerk of the court granting
the injunction shall transmit promptly to the other court a certified copy
of all papers in the case on file in such clerk's office.
Comments
The ordinary burden of proof for obtaining an injunction has been
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reversed to make it easier for the softright owner to enforce his rights.
This provision should not encourage frivolous suits, since the court may
award the defendant attorney fees under section 705 if it determines that
the plaintiff's suit is frivolous.
§ 703. Remedies for infringement: Impounding and disposition of in-
fringing articles
(a) While an action under this Act is pending, the court may at any
time order the impoundment, on such terms as it may deem reasonable,
of all copies or derivative software claimed to have been made in viola-
tion of the softright owner's exclusive rights and all other articles by means
of which such copies may be reproduced.
(b) As part of a final judgment or decree, the court may order the
destruction or other reasonable disposition of all copies found to have
been made in violation of the softright owner's exclusive rights and of
all other articles by means of which such copies may be reproduced.
§ 704. Remedies for infringement: Damages and profits
(a) In general-Except as otherwise provided by this Act, an infringer
of softright is liable for the greatest of-
(1) the softright owner's actual damages;
(2) the profits of the infringer as provided by subsection (b)
of this section; or
(3) statutory damages as provided by subsection (c) of this
section.
(b) Profits-In establishing the amount of the infringer's profits, the
softright owner is required to present proof only of the infringer's gross
revenue, and the infringer is required to prove the elements of revenue
attributable to factors other than the softrighted software. The infringer
is not entitled to any deduction for expenses attributable to the softrighted
software.
(c) Statutory damages-
(1) When the court finds that acts of infringement have been
committed willfully, the court shall grant statutory damages of
$50,000 for the first act of infringement and $10,000 for each
additional act of infringement. For purposes of this subsection,
each unauthorized copy which is made shall constitute a separate
act of infringement, and each unauthorized distribution of an
unauthorized copy or copy of derivative software shall constitute
a separate act of infringement. Unauthorized copying shall be
presumed to be willful when the following notice appeared on
the first screen or page or at the beginning of a sound recording
of the software:
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This software is protected by softright. If you are a lawful
possessor of this software you have the following rights:
(a) to create derivative software based upon
the softrighted software in your possession for
private use;
(b) to reproduce the software in copies for
any of the following purposes or similar purposes:
(1) modifying the software for
private use;
(2) transferring the software to
a different storage medium;
(3) making backup copies to
replace the original copy should it become
damaged or destroyed.
Copying for other purposes or distribution by
gift, exchange, sale or any other means of con-
veyance of copies of this software or of software
based on this software, without the express permis-
sion of the softright owner, is an infringement of
softright for which you may be liable for $50,000
in fines or punitive damages for the first infringing
copy and $10,000 for each additional infringing
copy. Any person who provides evidence leading to
the conviction of any other person for a violation
of a softright is entitled to a reward of up to
$10,000.
(2) In all cases where willfulness is neither independently
shown nor presumed, the court shall grant statutory damages in
a sum of not less than $250 or more than $10,000, as the court
considers just, for each act of infringement with respect to each
piece of registered software involved in the action, for which any
infringer is liable individually, or for which any two or more in-
fringers are liable jointly and severally. In the event the soft-right
owner proves actual damages in excess of this amount or that
the infringer's profits from the infringement were in excess of
this amount, the court shall award the greater of the damages
or profits proved.
(d) The person or persons who provide evidence necessary to
prove infringement are jointly entitled to ten percent of the damage
award, unless that amount exceeds $10,000 per person in which




This section and the following two sections should make legal en-
forcement of rights under this Act economically feasible.
§ 705. Remedies for other civil violations
(a) Anyone who violates any section of this Act other than sections
701 through 704 or 707 shall be liable for-
(1) a fine of $5000 if sued by the United States Government, or
(2) the greater of the actual damages proved or $5000 in
statutory damages if sued by a private plaintiff.
(b) Suits under this section are subject to the provisions of section
706 on attorney fees.
§ 706. Remedies for infringement: Costs and attorney fees
In any civil action under this Act, the court in its discretion may
allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the
United States or an officer thereof. Except as otherwise provided by this
Act, the court may award reasonable attorney fees to a successful plain-
tiff. The court may award reasonable attorney fees to a successful defen-
dant if it determines that the plaintiff's suit was frivolous. This section
shall be interpreted liberally.
§ 707. Criminal offenses
(a) Criminal infringement-Any person who infringes a softright
willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial
gain shall be fined not less than $50,000 for the first infringing act and
$10,000 for each additional infringing act or imprisoned for not more
than one year, or both. For purposes of this section, each unauthorized
copy that is made shall constitute a separate act of infringement, and
each unauthorized distribution of an unauthorized copy or a copy of
derivative software shall constitute a separate act of infringement.
(b) Forfeiture and destruction-When any person is convicted of any
violation of subsection (a) of this section, the court in its judgment of
conviction shall, in addition to the penalty therein prescribed, order the
forfeiture and destruction or other disposition of all infringing copies and
all implements, devices, or equipment used in the manufacture of such
infringing copies.
(c) Fraudulent softright notice-Any person who, with fraudulent in-
tent, places on any article a notice of softright or words of the same
import that such person knows to be false, or who, with fraudulent in-
tent, distributes for profit or imports for distribution for profit any arti-
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cle bearing such notice or words that such person knows to be false, shall
be fined not more than $25,000 for the first offense and shall be fined
not more than $50,000 for any subsequent offense.
(d) Fraudulent removal of softright notice-Any person who, with
fraudulent intent, removes or alters any notice of softright appearing on
a copy of softrighted software shall be fined not more than $25,000 for
the first offense and shall be fined not more than $50,000 for any subse-
quent offense.
(e) False representation-Any person who knowingly makes a false
representation of a material fact in the application for softright registra-
tion described by section 402, or in any written statement filed in connec-
tion with such an application shall be fined not more than $25,000.
(f) Distribution for profit without registration-Any person who
willfully distributes software for profit without prior registration shall
forfeit the softright in the software and shall be fined not more than
$25,000.
(g) In addition to any fine imposed by subsections (a) through (f)
of this section, the court may impose upon any person convicted of a
violation of this section the reasonable costs of the criminal proceedings,
including a reasonable fee to compensate the United States for the time
which the prosecutor expended on the case.
(h) The person or persons who provide evidence necessary to prove
an infringement are jointly entitled to ten percent of the fine assessed
for that infringement under subsections (a) through (f) of this section,
unless that amount exceeds $10,000 per person in which case each person
providing such evidence is entitled to $10,000.
§ 708. Limitations on actions
(a) Criminal proceedings-No criminal proceeding shall be maintained
under the provisions of this Act unless it is commenced within three years
from the date on which the criminal act occurred.
(b) Civil actions-No civil action shall be maintained under the pro-
visions of this Act unless it is commenced within three years from the
date on which the claim accrued.
§ 709. Notification of filing and determination of actions
Within one month after the filing of any action under this Act, the
clerks of the courts of the United States shall send written notification
of the action to the Register of Softrights; this notice shall set forth, as
far as is shown by the papers filed in the court, the names and addresses
of the parties to the action and the title, author, and registration number
of each piece of software involved in the action. If any other softrighted
software is later included in the action by amendment, answer, or other
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pleading, the clerk shall also send a notification concerning it to the
Register within one month after the pleading is filed.
§ 801. Infringing importation of copies
(a) Importation into the United States of copies of software that have
been acquired outside the United States without authorization from the
owner of softright under this Act is an infringement ofthe exclusive right
to distribute copies under section 105 and is actionable under section 701.
However, this subsection does not apply to-
(1) the importation of copies under the authority or for the
use of the government of the United States or of any state or
political subdivision of a state, but not including copies for use
in schools;
(2) the importation by any person of no more than one copy
of a particular piece of software at any one time, provided that
such importation is for the private use of the importer and not
for distribution, or by any person arriving from outside the United
States of copies forming part of such person's personal baggage; or
(3) the importation of no more than five copies of a particular
software by or for an organization operated for scholarly, educa-
tional, or religious purposes and not for private gain for its library
lending or archival purposes, unless the importation of such copies
is part of an activity consisting of systematic reproduction or
distribution engaged in by such organization in violation of sec-
tion 107.
(b) In cases where the making of the copies would have constituted
an infringement of softright if this Act had been applicable, the importa-
tion of such copies is prohibited. In cases where the making of the copies
would have been lawful if this Act had been applicable, the United States
Customs Service has no authority to prevent the importation of such
copies. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to prescribe by regula-
tion a procedure under which any person claiming an interest in the soft-
right of a particular piece of software may, upon payment of a specified
fee, be entitled to notification by the Customs Service of the importation
of articles that appear to be copies of that piece of software.
§ 802. Importation prohibitions: Enforcement and disposition of excluded
articles
(a) The Secretary of the Treasury and the United States Postal Ser-
vice shall separately or jointly make regulations for the enforcement of
the provisions of this Act prohibiting importation.
(b) These regulations may require, as a condition for the exclusion
of articles under section 801-
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(1) that the person seeking exclusion obtain a court order. en-
joining importation of the articles, or
(2) that the person seeking exclusion furnish proof, of a specified
nature and in accordance with prescribed procedures, that the soft-
right in which such person claims an interest is valid and that
the importation would violate the prohibition in section 801; the
person seeking exclusion may also be required to post a surety
bond for any injury that may result if the retention or exclusion
of the articles proves to be unjustified.
(c) Articles imported in violation of the importation prohibition of
this Act are subject to seizure and forfeiture in the same manner as prop-
erty imported in violation of the customs revenue law. Forfeited articles
shall be destroyed as directed by the Secretary of the Treasury or the
court, as the case may be; however, the articles may be returned to the
country of export whenever it is shown to the satisfaction of the Secretary
of the Treasury that the importer has no reasonable grounds for believ-
ing that his or her acts constituted a violation of law.
§ 901. The Softright Office: General responsibilities
(a) All administrative functions and duties under this Act, except as
otherwise specified, are the responsibility of the Register of Softrights as
director of the Softright Office.
(b) The Register of Softrights shall adopt a seal which shall be used
to authenticate all certified documents issued by the Softright Office.
(c) The Register of Softrights shall make an annual report to the Con-
gress of the work and accomplishments of the Softright Office during
the previous fiscal year. The annual report of the Register of Softrights
shall be published.
(d) Except as provided by section 906(b) and the regulations issued
thereunder, all actions taken by the Register of Softrights under this Act
are subject to the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, ch.
324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended.
§ 902. Softright Office regulations
The Register of Softrights is authorized to establish regulations not
inconsistent with law for the administration of the functions and duties
made the responsibility of the Register under this Act.
§ 903. Effective date of actions in Softright Office
In any case in which time limits are prescribed under this Act for
the performance of an action by the Softright Office, and in which the
last day of the prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, holiday
or other nonbusiness day within the District of Columbia or the federal
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government, the action may be taken on the next succeeding business day,
and is effective as of the date when the period expired.
§ 904. Retention and disposition of articles deposited in the Softright
Office
(a) Upon their deposit in the Softright Office under section 401
through 405, all copies, including those deposited in connection with claims
that have been refused registration, are the property of the United States
government.
(b) In the case of Class B software which is distributed for profit,
all materials deposited are available to the Library of Congress for its
collections, or for exchange or transfer to any other library. In the case
of Class B software which is not distributed for profit, the Library of
Congress is entitled, under regulations that the Register of Softrights shall
prescribe, to select any deposits for its collections, for transfer to the Na-
tional Archives of the United States, or for transfer to a federal records
center as defined in section 2901 of title 44 of the United States Code.
(c) The Register of Softrights is authorized to make reproductions
of all or part of any material deposited in the Softright Office records
of registration under sections 401 through 405 for inclusion before transfer-
ring such material to the Library of Congress as provided by subsection
(b) of this section or before destroying or otherwise disposing of such
material as provided for by subsection (d) of this section.
(d) Deposits not selected by the Library under subsection (b) of this
section shall be retained under the control of the Softright Office, in-
cluding retention in government storage facilities, for ten years from the
date of application for registration. After that period, it is within the
discretion of the Register to order their destruction or other disposition.
§ 905. Softright Office records: preparation, maintenance, public inspec-
tion, and searching
(a) The Register of Softrights shall provide and keep in the Softright
Office records of all deposits, registrations, recordations, and other ac-
tions taken under this Act, and shall prepare indexes of all such records.
(b) Such records and indexes, as well as all articles deposited in con-
nection with completed softright registrations and retained under the con-
trol of the Softright Office, shall be open to public inspection except as
otherwise provided by this Act.
(c) Upon request and payment of the fee specified by section 908,
the Softright Office shall make a search of its public records, indexes,
and deposits, and shall furnish a report of the information disclosed therein
with respect to any particular deposits, registrations, or recorded
documents.
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§ 906. Copies of Softright Office records
(a) Copies may be made of any public records or indexes of the Soft-
right Office, and additional certificates of softright registration and copies
of any public records or indexes may be furnished upon request and pay-
ment of the fees specified by section 908.
(b) Copies or reproductions of deposited articles retained under the
control of the Softright Office shall be authorized or furnished only under
the conditions specified by the Softright Office regulations.
§ 907. Softright Office forms and publications
(a) Catalog of softright entries-The Register of Softrights shall com-
pile and publish at periodic intervals catalogs of all softright registrations.
The Register has discretion to determine, on the basis of practicability
and usefulness, the form and frequency of publication of the catalogs.
(b) Other publications-Upon request, the Register shall furnish, free
of charge, application forms for softright registration and general infor-
mational material in connection with the functions of the Softright Of-
fice. The Register also has the authority to publish compilations of infor-
mation, bibliographies, and other material which he considers to be of
value to the public.
(c) Distribution of publications-All publications of the Softright Of-
fice shall be furnished to depository libraries as specified under section
1905 of title 44 of the United States Code and, aside from those fur-
nished free of charge, shall be offered for sale to the public at prices
based on the cost of reproduction and distribution.
§ 908. Softright Office fees
(a) For each of the following services, the following fees shall be paid
to the Register of Softrights:
(1) for the registration of a Class B softright claim, including
the issuance of a certificate of registration-$25;
(2) for the registration of a Class A softright claim, including
the issuance of a certificate of registration-$100;
(3) for the recordation, as provided by section 604, of a transfer
of softright ownership or other document of six pages or less,
covering no more than one title-$10; and for each page over
six and each title over one, an additional 50 cents;
(4) for the issuance of an additional certificate of registration
under section 906-$5;
(5) for the issuance of any other certification-$5;
(6) for the making and reporting of a search as provided by
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section 905, and for any related services-$10 for each hour or
fraction of an hour consumed;
(7) for any other special services requiring a substantial amount
of time or expense, such fees as the Register of Softrights may
fix on the basis of the cost of providing the service;
(8) the Register of Softrights has the discretion to fix fees for
preparing copies of Softright Office records on the basis of their
cost.
(b) The fees prescribed by this section for services are applicable to
the United States government and any of its agencies, employees, or of-
ficers, but the Register of Softrights has discretion to waive the fees pro-
vided for in this section in occasional cases involving relatively small
amounts.
(c) All fees received under this section shall be deposited by the
Register of Softrights in the Treasury of the United States and shall be
credited to the appropriation for the necessary expenses of the Softright
Office. The Register may, in accordance with regulations that he shall
prescribe, refund any sum paid by mistake or any payment in excess of
the fee required by this section; however, there shall be no refund for
the denial or refusal to register a Class A software claim.
§ 1001. Preemption with respect to other laws
Except in accordance with the provisions of section 201, this Act shall
preempt all intellectual property protection for software under copyright,
patent or trade secret law.
Comments
This provision should relieve the uncertainty caused by the overlap-
ping of current intellectual property protection schemes.
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